Litter origins, accumulation rates, and hierarchical composition on urban roadsides of the Inland Empire, California

Urban areas are the primary source of human-made litter globally, and roadsides are a primary accumulation location. This study aimed to investigate how litter arrives at roadsides and determine the accumulation rate and composition of roadside litter. We monitored select roadsides in the Inland Empire, California, for litter abundance (count) and composition (material, item, and brand type). Receipt litter with sale time and location information was used to investigate whether wind, runoff, or human travel were dominant transport agents. Only 9% of the receipts could have experienced runoff, and wind direction was not correlated with receipt transport direction. However, human travel and receipt transport distances were similar in magnitude and distribution, suggesting that the displacement of litter from the place of purchase was predominantly affected by human travel. The median distance receipts traveled from the sale location to the litter observation location was 1.6 km, suggesting that most sources were nearby to where the litter was found. Litter accumulation rates were surprisingly stable (mean 40,349 (33,255-47,865) #/km/year or 1170 (917-1447) kg/km/year) despite repeated cleanups and the COVID-19 stay-at-home orders. A new approach was employed to hierarchically bootstrap litter composition proportions and estimate uncertainties. The most abundant materials were plastic and paper. Food-related items and tobacco products were the most common item types. The identified branded objects were from the primary manufacturers (Philip Morris (4, 2-7 %), Mars Incorporated (2, 1-3 %), RJ Reynolds (2, 1-3 %), and Jack in The Box (1, 1-3 %)), but unbranded objects were prevalent. Therefore, identifiable persistent labeling on all products would benefit future litter-related corporate social responsibility efforts. High-resolution monitoring on roadsides can inform urban litter prevention strategies by elucidating litter source, transport, and accumulation dynamics.

(Un)lucky Strike and the Winnie Blues: Tobacco Plain Packaging, Investment Treaties, and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

<p>In recent years, tobacco has been the subject of increasingly more stringent regulatory attention. At the same time there has been a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, While the former compels state Parties to take action to reduce tobacco consumption, many of the latter provide a guarantee to foreign investors that states will not enact measures which result in a substantial reduction of the value of their property. Recent disputes illustrate that these two sets of obligations are not capable of coexistence. In 2012 Australia took regulatory action, enacting legislation obliging the sale of tobacco products in “plain” packets. Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco took to a number of different fora to challenge the measures as being in violation of their rights under national constitutional law, world trade law, and under nternational investment law. While the domestic law claims were limited to an assessment of the measure in the context of the companies’ constitutional rights, and the WTO claims face a significant hurdle because of the public interest nature of the regulations, the claims brought as international investment arbitrations are not subject to these same constraints. The result is a conflict of obligations. States are left in a position where they must take steps to reduce tobacco consumption while at the same time refraining from action amounting to expropriation of an investment. Does one of these obligations take priority of the other? Or must they both, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests, be performed in good faith? The application of various conflicts rules imported from domestic and private international law into the international law sphere more generally yields some answers, goes some way to resolving the conflict, and reconstitutes the otherwise increasingly fragmented international law.</p>

(Un)lucky Strike and the Winnie Blues: Tobacco Plain Packaging, Investment Treaties, and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

<p>In recent years, tobacco has been the subject of increasingly more stringent regulatory attention. At the same time there has been a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, While the former compels state Parties to take action to reduce tobacco consumption, many of the latter provide a guarantee to foreign investors that states will not enact measures which result in a substantial reduction of the value of their property. Recent disputes illustrate that these two sets of obligations are not capable of coexistence. In 2012 Australia took regulatory action, enacting legislation obliging the sale of tobacco products in “plain” packets. Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco took to a number of different fora to challenge the measures as being in violation of their rights under national constitutional law, world trade law, and under nternational investment law. While the domestic law claims were limited to an assessment of the measure in the context of the companies’ constitutional rights, and the WTO claims face a significant hurdle because of the public interest nature of the regulations, the claims brought as international investment arbitrations are not subject to these same constraints. The result is a conflict of obligations. States are left in a position where they must take steps to reduce tobacco consumption while at the same time refraining from action amounting to expropriation of an investment. Does one of these obligations take priority of the other? Or must they both, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests, be performed in good faith? The application of various conflicts rules imported from domestic and private international law into the international law sphere more generally yields some answers, goes some way to resolving the conflict, and reconstitutes the otherwise increasingly fragmented international law.</p>

Principle of Proportionality and Judicial Discretion in ICSID Arbitration: A Case Study of Tobacco Industry

In the 2003 Tecmedv. Mexico case, the principle of proportionality, which was already practiced under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, was transplanted to investment arbitration cases under the ICSID. Tobacco control regulations are imposed on tobacco company by state to protect the public health. In landmark case Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the tribunal resorted to the principle of proportionality to prove that tobacco control measures do not constitute the violation of investment treaty. Nevertheless, few have discussed discretionary issues caused by this expanded use especially. This article attempts to challenge the current manner in which the principle of proportionality is utilized in investment arbitration under ICSID. More specifically, it seeks to challenge the discretion exerted by the tribunals when the principle is applied especially applied to tobacco control regulations. This article will demonstrate how the unwarranted judicial discretion has a detrimental effect on predicting how the ICSID tribunals will protect property rights while balancing the host states’ power to regulate.

Turning a threat into an opportunity: British American Tobacco’s weakening of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products

BackgroundPrevious research has outlined transnational tobacco company (TTC) efforts to undermine implementation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol) and evidence of ongoing TTC complicity in the illicit tobacco trade (ITT). However, the industry’s views on the Protocol and role in its development are not well understood.MethodsSystematic searching and analysis of leaked documents—approximately 15 000 from British American Tobacco (BAT) and 35 from Philip Morris International, triangulated via searches of online resources and interviews with five stakeholders across academia, international organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector.FindingsEvidence indicates that after privately viewing the Protocol as a significant threat (2003), BAT worked to influence its content, while publicly signalling support for it (2007–2012), and was largely satisfied with the final text. BAT successfully pushed for a non-prescriptive text which enabled further country-level TTC influence during the Protocol’s implementation phase. The final text also reflected other BAT policy preferences, including preventing outright bans on duty-free sales and intermingling, and making it difficult to sanction and hold tobacco companies accountable for ongoing involvement in the ITT. TTC representatives were present during early Protocol negotiations, despite rules against this, and BAT obtained draft texts before they were public and paid at least one delegate to support its position.ConclusionsBAT’s primary interest in shaping the Protocol was to minimise its financial and legal costs for BAT while maximising potential costs to small competitors. These findings raise concern about the Protocol’s ability to control the ITT, particularly given TTCs’ intention to influence ongoing national implementation. An effective Protocol is vital to controlling both the ITT and ongoing tobacco industry involvement in it and, in turn, governments’ ability to increase tobacco taxes and thereby save lives.

Claims of reduced odor on tobacco packs in low- and middle-income countries

Introduction Cigarettes designed to have less smoke smell were developed by the tobacco industry to supposedly reduce negative qualities. Cigarettes with marketing claims communicating these designs have been sold in high-income countries and marketing of “less smoke smell” terms on cigarette packaging can promote cigarette use. It is unclear to what extent they have been marketed in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Methods The Tobacco Pack Surveillance System (TPackSS) systemically collected tobacco packs available in 14 LMICs with high tobacco use between 2013-2017. We coded 4,354 packs for marketing appeals, including claims related to smoke smell. We describe “less smoke smell” and similar claims found on these packs and compare across country and tobacco manufacturers. Results Phrases communicating less smoke smell were present on packs purchased in nine of 14 LMICs, including Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. The most commonly (74.1%) used terminology was “less smoke smell”, "LSS" or a combination of the two. Packs from Russia had the most prevalent use (11.8%) of such claims. Companies using these terms across 21 brands included Japan Tobacco International (JTI), British American Tobacco (BAT), Philip Morris International (PMI) and other smaller companies. JTI accounted for 70.9% of packs with such terms. Conclusion Some of the world’s largest tobacco companies are communicating less smoke smell on packs in LMICs. Less smoke smell and similar phrases on packaging should be prohibited because they can enhance the appeal of cigarettes. Implications Tobacco companies are using “less smoke smell” and similar phrases on cigarette packs in LMICs. These claims have the potential to increase the appeal of smoking and promote cigarette use. Countries should consider policies to restrict attractive labeling claims, in accordance with the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article 13 guidelines, which recommends restrictions on attractive design elements on tobacco packaging.