What Red Lines, If Any, Do the Lisbon Judgments of European Constitutional Courts Draw for Future EU Integration?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Theil
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1045-1057
Author(s):  
Teresa Violante

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union is the story of a clash foretold, if one takes seriously constitutional courts as institutions designed to be “dogs that bite.” The German Court consistently developed a doctrinal tool to guide its role as guardian of the national constitutional order and the democratic principle, and enforced it when the constitutional control of monetary policy measures so required. I analyze the PSPP ruling, focusing on where the Court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory statement of reasons by the European Central Bank prevented it from reviewing the proportionality of the program. I argue that the Court, after conducting a substantive assessment, applied a weak remedy, thereby deferring the last word on the constitutionality of the PSPP to the political branches. In doing so, the Court opens space for the political assessment of a controversial monetary policy, enhancing the politicization of the Economic and Monetary Union, and provides a doctrinal toolbox for national constitutional courts that face competence creep of EU law in their jurisdictions. I conclude that, ultimately, the main merit of constitutional courts’ interventions in the EU integration is that they are in a privileged position to allow for the politicization of technocratic processes.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Theil

The lingering European financial crisis continues to threaten the Eurozone and, in the opinion of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the very survival of the European idea. With this apocalyptic rhetoric, it is easily forgotten that only nine years earlier Europe overcame a predicament that was, at the time, equally described as the most challenging in its history. Two failed referendums in Member States of the European Union (Member States)—namely, in France and the Netherlands—stopped the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) in its tracks and led to an extended “period of reflection” for Europe's leaders. From this emerged a reboot of the Constitutional Treaty, now dubbed the Treaty of Lisbon, with few substantial changes, but more success throughout the ratification procedures. The final hurdle presented itself in the form of institutionally strong Constitutional Courts (CC) and Tribunals (CT) of the European Member States. Of these, the following were at one time or another seized with complaints against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: The AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshof(Austrian CC), the Belgian CC, theÚstavní soud České republiky(Czech CC), the FrenchConseil Constitutionnel(French CC), the GermanBundesverfassungsgericht(German CC), the Hungarian CC, theLatvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa(Latvian CC), the PolishTrybunał Konstytucyjny(Polish CT), and theTribunal Constitucional de España(Spanish CT).


2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Baimbridge ◽  
Jeffrey Harrop ◽  
George Philippidis

Author(s):  
Pierre Rosanvallon

It's a commonplace occurrence that citizens in Western democracies are disaffected with their political leaders and traditional democratic institutions. But this book argues that this crisis of confidence is partly a crisis of understanding. The book makes the case that the sources of democratic legitimacy have shifted and multiplied over the past thirty years and that we need to comprehend and make better use of these new sources of legitimacy in order to strengthen our political self-belief and commitment to democracy. Drawing on examples from France and the United States, the book notes that there has been a major expansion of independent commissions, NGOs, regulatory authorities, and watchdogs in recent decades. At the same time, constitutional courts have become more willing and able to challenge legislatures. These institutional developments, which serve the democratic values of impartiality and reflexivity, have been accompanied by a new attentiveness to what the book calls the value of proximity, as governing structures have sought to find new spaces for minorities, the particular, and the local. To improve our democracies, we need to use these new sources of legitimacy more effectively and we need to incorporate them into our accounts of democratic government. This book is an original contribution to the vigorous international debate about democratic authority and legitimacy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka

Summary The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadiehezka Paola Palencia Tejedor

This work focuses on a compared analysis of the South Afri- can decision related to the “peace and reconciliation act” of this country’s Parliament, and the Colombian decision regarding the amendment of the constitution called “The juridical framework for the peace.” Turning to the structure, it is developed in three major topics: 1. It provides a brief of the historical context, political background and an overview of the two decisions.2. It gives a structural analysis of the powers that each Court has and the nature of the constitutional mechanism through which both Courts decided the constitutionality of the said norms 3. It presents a critical analysis on the similarities and differences between the two systems and judgments. It presents some con- clusions. 


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