scholarly journals Why Do Institutional Investors Oppose Shareholder Activism? Evidence from Voting in Proxy Contests

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanran Liu
Author(s):  
Anita Indira Anand

This chapter explores shareholder activism carried out by “wolf packs.” Just as a blockholder with a sizable percentage of the corporation’s equity can significantly influence a firm’s governance, a wolf pack is a group of investors that attacks a target corporation in tandem under the leadership of a single, sophisticated activist, collectively acquiring enough equity to form a de facto block. The chapter then looks at the formation of wolf packs and conflicting theories that attempt to explain their behavior. It also focuses on their ability to acquire considerable power in a corporation, considering the challenges that presents to legal regimes, particularly in proxy contests and other change-of-control transactions. Changes of control, especially in cases of hostile takeovers, are controversial because they often necessitate a consideration of strategic objectives different from those of the target company’s board prior to the takeover.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mila Ivanova

Purpose This study aims to foster a deeper understanding of socio-ethical shareholder activism by outlining the corporate campaigning strategies of a UK-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) and by assessing their impact on both institutional investors and the practices of two multinational companies. As we move into a world where shareholder ownership is becoming more democratised, shareholder activism is gaining prominence in the USA, Europe and Asia, opening new avenues for participation in corporate governance by stakeholders such as NGOs who have traditionally been uninvolved in corporate decisions. Design/methodology/approach The article adopts a qualitative methodology and case study research design. It relies on semi-structured interviews, analysis of documents and participant observation. Findings First, the study sheds light into the ways in which NGOs are connecting themselves to the financial sector. It argues that they can pursue their political goals by framing their arguments in a way that emphasises the short-term financial risks/benefits for investors. Secondly, it demystifies the term “shareholder activism”, transforming it from an action tool belonging only to big and powerful institutions, to a tool which gives other stakeholders such as NGOs and ordinary people a real stake in companies’ affairs. What is more, the study highlights the divergent nature of institutional shareholder activist intervention in the USA and the UK. Research Limitations/implications Given the generally long-term nature of shareholder campaigns, which can sometimes span over several years, it could be beneficial to adopt a longitudinal research design. Future research can endeavour to focus on a number of different campaigns over a period that exceeds three years. Practical Implications The research has implications for NGOs adopting a shareholder activist campaigning model and for policy makers aiming to encourage investor stewardship. Originality/value The fact that the research field of NGO socio-ethical shareholder activism is relatively new and under-explored by academia, coupled with the growing incidence of the phenomenon in the UK and across the world, as well as its potential benefits for society as a whole, renders further investigation into the topic necessary.


2011 ◽  
Vol 64 (12) ◽  
pp. 1352-1360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hadani ◽  
Maria Goranova ◽  
Raihan Khan

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Shaokai Huang ◽  
Rui Xie

This paper investigates impact of shareholder activism on corporate governance in China. The separation of ownership and management of companies often to some extent causes agency problems between shareholders and company managers. In Western countries, shareholders of a company usually actively participate in the company’s management and closely monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance. At present, China’s securities market, along with institutional investors, is undergoing a rapid development. Nevertheless, problems in corporate governance among listed companies have been hindering the development of capital markets in China. Meanwhile, institutional investors have experienced significant growth. Moreover, national policies, as well as the split-share structure reform, further encourage the growth of institutional investors and their active participation in corporate governance for further promotion of the development of capital markets. Making empirical contribution, this paper tests how effective institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) “A” Shares after share reform in China. Results of empirical estimation indicate that China’s institutional investors do participate in corporate governance, but only to some extent. Positive behaviors of Chinese shareholders have played a favorable role in improving corporate governance.


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