Strategic Justification in Claims Problems: Procedurally Fair and Multilateral Bargaining Game

Author(s):  
Makoto Hagiwara ◽  
Shunsuke Hanato

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cadigan ◽  
Pamela Schmitt ◽  
Robert Shupp ◽  
Kurtis Swope


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 149-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Baranski

I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low. (JEL C78, D63, D71, D72, H41)



2009 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cadigan ◽  
Pamela Schmitt ◽  
Robert Shupp ◽  
Kurtis Swope






Author(s):  
Teresa Estañ ◽  
Natividad Llorca ◽  
Ricardo Martínez ◽  
Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

AbstractIn this paper we study the class of claims problems where the amount to be divided is perfectly divisible and claims are made on indivisible units of several items. Each item has a price, and the available amount falls short to be able to cover all the claims at the given prices. We propose several properties that may be of interest in this particular framework. These properties represent the common principles of fairness, efficiency, and non-manipulability by merging or splitting. Efficiency is our focal principle, which is formalized by means of two axioms: non-wastefulness and Pareto efficiency. We show that some combinations of the properties we consider are compatible, others are not.



2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 4721-4730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu An ◽  
Jie Duan ◽  
Mo-Yuen Chow ◽  
Alexandra Duel-Hallen


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