Pay for Destruction: The Stock Buybacks That Make CEOs Rich But Impoverish Their Firms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nitzan Shilon
Keyword(s):  
Stock Buybacks

Stock Buybacks: Value Creation or Destruction?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Value Creation ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Accounting rules? Stock buybacks and stock options: Additional evidence

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Griffin ◽  
Ning Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Equalizing the Tax Treatment of Stock Buybacks and Dividends

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hemel ◽  
Gregg D. Polsky
Keyword(s):  
Stock Buybacks

Do firms have a tax incentive for stock buybacks? An empirical examination

2004 ◽  
pp. 117-136
Author(s):  
Daryl M. Guffey ◽  
Dan L. Schisler ◽  
Douglas K. Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Tax Incentive ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Director Stock Compensation: An Invitation to a Conspicuous Conflict of Interests?

2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan R. Dalton ◽  
Catherine M. Daily
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Corporate Managers ◽  
Performance Targets ◽  
Compensation Packages ◽  
Stock Buybacks ◽  
Stock Compensation

Abstract:While many aspects of stock and option based compensation for corporate officers remain controversial, we suggest that the growing trend for similar practices in favor of boards of directors will prove to be even more contentious. High-ranking corporate managers do not set their own salaries nor authorize their own stock options. By contrast, boards of directors do, in fact, set their own compensation packages. Other potential conflicts of interest include setting option performance targets, stock buybacks, stock option resets and reloads, consolidations (mergers and acquisitions), and service on multiple boards. As trust is the most valuable commodity in a capitalist society, we suggest that these potential conflicts of interest and related outcomes may ultimately serve to erode any anticipated benefits of director stock compensation.

Accounting Rules? Stock Buybacks and Stock Options: Additional Evidence

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Griffin ◽  
Ning Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Accelerating Corporate Performance: Stock Buybacks with Zip

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-128
Author(s):  
Paul D. Kimmel ◽  
Terry D. Warfield
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Investment Banking ◽  
Share Repurchase ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Financial Instruments ◽  
Stock Repurchase ◽  
Earnings Per Share ◽  
Potential Risks ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Like many companies, Caravan International occasionally repurchases its shares in the open market. With a traditional stock repurchase program, Caravan and other companies sometimes are unable to maximize the financial reporting benefits of stock buybacks. However, the “Accelerated Share Repurchase” (ASR) agreement, recently introduced by the investment banking industry, allows companies to execute their treasury stock programs and take some of the uncertainty out of share repurchase transactions. This case provides a context for examining the specific benefits of these plans as well as the potential risks. It will help you understand earnings per share (EPS) calculations and the accounting for financial instruments used in ASRs. The case illustrates how managers sometimes structure transactions to take advantage of favorable accounting treatment, and thus achieve EPS targets.

Who Wins in Large Stock Buybacks—Those Who Sell or Those Who Hold?

CFA Digest ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-34
Author(s):  
Roger Ignatius
Keyword(s):  
Stock Buybacks
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