Accounting Rules? Stock Buybacks and Stock Options: Additional Evidence

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Griffin ◽  
Ning Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Accounting rules? Stock buybacks and stock options: Additional evidence

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Griffin ◽  
Ning Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Director Stock Compensation: An Invitation to a Conspicuous Conflict of Interests?

2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan R. Dalton ◽  
Catherine M. Daily
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Corporate Managers ◽  
Performance Targets ◽  
Compensation Packages ◽  
Stock Buybacks ◽  
Stock Compensation

Abstract:While many aspects of stock and option based compensation for corporate officers remain controversial, we suggest that the growing trend for similar practices in favor of boards of directors will prove to be even more contentious. High-ranking corporate managers do not set their own salaries nor authorize their own stock options. By contrast, boards of directors do, in fact, set their own compensation packages. Other potential conflicts of interest include setting option performance targets, stock buybacks, stock option resets and reloads, consolidations (mergers and acquisitions), and service on multiple boards. As trust is the most valuable commodity in a capitalist society, we suggest that these potential conflicts of interest and related outcomes may ultimately serve to erode any anticipated benefits of director stock compensation.

Stock Buybacks and Their Association with Stock Options Exercised in the IT Industry

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David N. Hurtt ◽  
Jerry G. Kreuze ◽  
Sheldon A. Langsam
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
It Industry ◽  
Stock Buybacks

Proposed Accounting Rules for Employee Stock Options

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 31-36
Author(s):  
Barbara Whitaker Shimko ◽  
James J. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Employee Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Rules

Alternatives to Traditional Repricing of Executive Stock Options

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 35-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry T. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Subjective Value ◽  
Dynamic Agency ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Incentive Measure ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Associated Variable

The main purpose of this paper is to examine two commonly used alternatives to traditional repricing (TR) of executive stock options (ESOs) in a dynamic agency model. TR practices have become obsolete since new accounting rules took effect in July 2000. To avoid associated variable accounting charges that cause uncertainty in future reported earnings, companies have tried several TR alternatives as solutions to rescuing underwater options. We justify the occurrence of TR alternatives and quantify the impact of the marking-to-market feature imbedded in the new accounting rules. We also propose an incentive measure which is comparable to the subjective value of ESOs claimed by Ingersoll, J (2006) to rank TR alternatives in terms of agent's incentive.

STOCK OPTIONS AS A FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR AMERICAN EXECUTIVES: IMPACT ON ACCOUNTING RULES OF THEMES AND ARGUMENTS REPORTED IN NEWSPAPERS AND BUSINESS MAGAZINES, 1975-1993

1997 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna L. Street ◽  
David R. Fordham ◽  
Alison Wayland
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Rules

scholarly journals Stock Buybacks: Good Or Bad For Investors?

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 193 ◽  
Author(s):  
RamMohan R. Yallapragada
Keyword(s):  
Stock Prices ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Cash Balance ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Class A ◽  
Earnings Per Share ◽  
Stock Buyback ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
A Company ◽  
Stock Buybacks

A recent news flash announced that Warren Buffets Berkshire Hathaway would buy back $1.2 billion worth of its own Class A stock. In recent times, such stock buybacks are happening in rapid succession among companies all over the world. There are many advantages to investors of a company when the company buys back its own stock, generally known as treasury stock. Stock buybacks result in higher earnings per share (EPS), theoretically resulting in higher stock prices. Companies also resort to stock buybacks when they happen to have excessive cash balance. Cash rich companies are generally considered attractive targets for takeover possibilities. During times such as the present ones when returns on cash money market accounts do not yield attractive returns, companies usually implement stock buyback policies, thus earning better returns on excess cash while at the same time avoiding takeover possibilities. There are also some hidden advantages to senior management resulting from stock buybacks because of higher prices for their substantial stock options. There are also some disadvantages to investors resulting from stock buybacks. This paper presents some of the main reasons for stock buybacks, and the consequential advantages and disadvantages to investors and other stakeholders.

Stock Options als ein Instrument erfolgsorientierter Vergütung bei im NEMAX 50 notierten Unternehmen

Controlling ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. 707-714
Author(s):  
Christian Krensel ◽  
Andreas Siemes ◽  
Sina Afra
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options
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