Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keiichi Morimoto

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1098
Author(s):  
Keiichi Morimoto

Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.



Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore

This chapter argues that majority rule is a useful complement of inclusive deliberation, not just because majority rule is more efficient timewise, but because it has distinct epistemic properties of its own. It also stresses that majority rule is best designed for collective prediction—that is, the identification of the best options out of those selected during the deliberative phase. Of all the competing alternatives (rule of one or rule of the few), majority rule maximizes the chances of predicting the right answer among the proposed options. The chapter considers several accounts of the epistemic properties of majority rule, including the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Miracle of Aggregation, and a more fine-grained model based on cognitive diversity.



2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Ben-Yashar ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Hill ◽  
Renaud-Philippe Garner


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johanna Goertz ◽  
Francois Maniquet


Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann

This chapter analyses what happens when the assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem are not met. The first concern is about the existence of truths to be tracked in the political realm. We argue that there are many factual claims in politics that go beyond mere value judgements. The second concern is about agendas on which the correct answer is missing or there are multiple equally correct answers, a problem that cannot be fully dismissed but is limited in scope. The third concern is about strategic voting. We argue that these worries have been exaggerated, as strategic considerations are typically outweighed by expressive motives. We counter the fourth concern, that voters are often incompetent, on grounds that a systematic tendency to be wrong is unstable. Finally, the most serious concern, that votes are typically dependent, is investigated in detail, while solutions to this problem are offered in the next chapter.



2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372097471
Author(s):  
Peter Niesen

Cognitivist theories of democratic decision-making come in two flavours, which I label transparently and intransparently epistemic. Lafont’s deliberative theory of democracy has strengths in accounting for the transparently truth-tracing power of justification but lacks a plausible account of the intransparently truth-tracking power of aggregative approaches highlighted by, among others, Hélène Landemore, such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem. I suggest opting for an approach that includes semi-transparently epistemic mechanisms, that is, truth-tracking mechanisms, the workings of which can be explained, passing the public reason test, to all citizens.



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