Information, individual errors, and collective performance: Empirical evidence on the Condorcet Jury Theorem

1996 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore

This chapter argues that majority rule is a useful complement of inclusive deliberation, not just because majority rule is more efficient timewise, but because it has distinct epistemic properties of its own. It also stresses that majority rule is best designed for collective prediction—that is, the identification of the best options out of those selected during the deliberative phase. Of all the competing alternatives (rule of one or rule of the few), majority rule maximizes the chances of predicting the right answer among the proposed options. The chapter considers several accounts of the epistemic properties of majority rule, including the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Miracle of Aggregation, and a more fine-grained model based on cognitive diversity.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Ben-Yashar ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Hill ◽  
Renaud-Philippe Garner

Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann

This chapter analyses what happens when the assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem are not met. The first concern is about the existence of truths to be tracked in the political realm. We argue that there are many factual claims in politics that go beyond mere value judgements. The second concern is about agendas on which the correct answer is missing or there are multiple equally correct answers, a problem that cannot be fully dismissed but is limited in scope. The third concern is about strategic voting. We argue that these worries have been exaggerated, as strategic considerations are typically outweighed by expressive motives. We counter the fourth concern, that voters are often incompetent, on grounds that a systematic tendency to be wrong is unstable. Finally, the most serious concern, that votes are typically dependent, is investigated in detail, while solutions to this problem are offered in the next chapter.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372097471
Author(s):  
Peter Niesen

Cognitivist theories of democratic decision-making come in two flavours, which I label transparently and intransparently epistemic. Lafont’s deliberative theory of democracy has strengths in accounting for the transparently truth-tracing power of justification but lacks a plausible account of the intransparently truth-tracking power of aggregative approaches highlighted by, among others, Hélène Landemore, such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem. I suggest opting for an approach that includes semi-transparently epistemic mechanisms, that is, truth-tracking mechanisms, the workings of which can be explained, passing the public reason test, to all citizens.


Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Johanna M. M. Goertz

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative is elected with probability tending to one when the number of voters tends to infinity. The previous literature shows that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three alternatives that has an inefficient equilibrium. We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium, independent of the number of alternatives. Under certain circumstances (informative types), it is unique in elections with two alternatives. The existence of inefficient equilibria in elections with more than two alternatives is generic.


Author(s):  
Steve Alpern ◽  
Bo Chen ◽  
Adam J. Ostaszewski

Abstract Consider an odd-sized jury, which determines a majority verdict between two equiprobable states of Nature. If each juror independently receives a binary signal identifying the correct state with identical probability p, then the probability of a correct verdict tends to one as the jury size tends to infinity (Marquis de Condorcet in Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, Imprim. Royale, Paris, 1785). Recently, Alpern and Chen (Eur J Oper Res 258:1072–1081, 2017, Theory Decis 83:259–282, 2017) developed a model where jurors sequentially receive independent signals from an interval according to a distribution which depends on the state of Nature and on the juror’s “ability”, and vote sequentially. This paper shows that, to mimic Condorcet’s binary signal, such a distribution must satisfy a functional equation related to tail-balance, that is, to the ratio $$\alpha (t)$$ α ( t ) of the probability that a mean-zero random variable satisfies X$$>t$$ > t given that $$|X|>t$$ | X | > t . In particular, we show that under natural symmetry assumptions the tail-balances $$\alpha (t)$$ α ( t ) uniquely determine the signal distribution and so the distributions assumed in Alpern and Chen (Eur J Oper Res 258:1072–1081, 2017, Theory Decis 83:259–282, 2017) are uniquely determined for $$\alpha (t)$$ α ( t ) linear.


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