The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Dharmapala
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Expressive Function ◽  
Jury Theorem

Second Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Majority Rule

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
The Right

This chapter argues that majority rule is a useful complement of inclusive deliberation, not just because majority rule is more efficient timewise, but because it has distinct epistemic properties of its own. It also stresses that majority rule is best designed for collective prediction—that is, the identification of the best options out of those selected during the deliberative phase. Of all the competing alternatives (rule of one or rule of the few), majority rule maximizes the chances of predicting the right answer among the proposed options. The chapter considers several accounts of the epistemic properties of majority rule, including the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Miracle of Aggregation, and a more fine-grained model based on cognitive diversity.

The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Ben-Yashar ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Jury Theorem

scholarly journals Virtue signalling and the Condorcet Jury theorem

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Hill ◽  
Renaud-Philippe Garner
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Jury Theorem

Limitations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann
Keyword(s):  
Correct Answer ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
The Political ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
The Third ◽  
Value Judgements ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Political Realm

This chapter analyses what happens when the assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem are not met. The first concern is about the existence of truths to be tracked in the political realm. We argue that there are many factual claims in politics that go beyond mere value judgements. The second concern is about agendas on which the correct answer is missing or there are multiple equally correct answers, a problem that cannot be fully dismissed but is limited in scope. The third concern is about strategic voting. We argue that these worries have been exaggerated, as strategic considerations are typically outweighed by expressive motives. We counter the fourth concern, that voters are often incompetent, on grounds that a systematic tendency to be wrong is unstable. Finally, the most serious concern, that votes are typically dependent, is investigated in detail, while solutions to this problem are offered in the next chapter.

Truth-tracing versus truth-tracking: Lafont, Landemore and epistemic democracy

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372097471
Author(s):  
Peter Niesen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Epistemic Democracy ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Theory Of Democracy

Cognitivist theories of democratic decision-making come in two flavours, which I label transparently and intransparently epistemic. Lafont’s deliberative theory of democracy has strengths in accounting for the transparently truth-tracing power of justification but lacks a plausible account of the intransparently truth-tracking power of aggregative approaches highlighted by, among others, Hélène Landemore, such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem. I suggest opting for an approach that includes semi-transparently epistemic mechanisms, that is, truth-tracking mechanisms, the workings of which can be explained, passing the public reason test, to all citizens.

scholarly journals A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Johanna M. M. Goertz
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Condorcet Jury Theorem ◽  
Correct Alternative ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Voting Game ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Jury Theorem ◽  
Two Alternatives

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative is elected with probability tending to one when the number of voters tends to infinity. The previous literature shows that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three alternatives that has an inefficient equilibrium. We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium, independent of the number of alternatives. Under certain circumstances (informative types), it is unique in elections with two alternatives. The existence of inefficient equilibria in elections with more than two alternatives is generic.

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