Strategic Complementarity among Investors With Overlapping Portfolios

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof W. Stahel
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Complementarity

scholarly journals Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1098
Author(s):  
Keiichi Morimoto
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Information Use ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Jury Theorem

Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.

The New Keynesian Phillips curve under trend inflation and strategic complementarity

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hasan Bakhshi ◽  
Hashmat Khan ◽  
Pablo Burriel-Llombart ◽  
Barbara Rudolf
Keyword(s):  
Phillips Curve ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Phillips Curve ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Trend Inflation

Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 181-212
Author(s):  
Jonathan C. Glover ◽  
Hao Xue
Keyword(s):  
Performance Measures ◽  
Team Performance ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Relational Self ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
The Individual

ABSTRACT Teamwork and team incentives are increasingly prevalent in modern organizations. Performance measures used to evaluate individuals' contributions to teamwork are often non-verifiable. We study a principal-multi-agent model of relational (self-enforcing) contracts in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents, and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other by facilitating a strategic complementarity in their payoffs. In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure that is a noisy version of the individual non-verifiable measures, and show that the verifiable measure is either ignored or used to create a conditional bonus floor.

Optimization incentives in dilemma games with strategic complementarity

2020 ◽  
Vol 127 ◽  
pp. 103453
Author(s):  
Jan Potters ◽  
Sigrid Suetens
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Complementarity

Strategic complementarity of information in financial markets with large shocks

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Chamley
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Strategic Complementarity

scholarly journals Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1155-1178 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANDEEP BALIGA ◽  
ETHAN BUENO DE MESQUITA ◽  
ALEXANDER WOLITZKY
Keyword(s):  
Attack Detection ◽  
The Other ◽  
False Alarms ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Noisy Signal ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Recent Developments

Motivated by recent developments in cyberwarfare, we study deterrence in a world where attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In the model, each of $$ n $$ attackers may attack the defender. The defender observes a noisy signal that probabilistically attributes the attack. The defender may retaliate against one or more attackers and wants to retaliate against the guilty attacker only. We note an endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers: if one attacker becomes more aggressive, that attacker becomes more “suspect” and the other attackers become less suspect, which leads the other attackers to become more aggressive as well. Despite this complementarity, there is a unique equilibrium. We identify types of improvements in attribution that strengthen deterrence—namely, improving attack detection independently of any effect on the identifiability of the attacker, reducing false alarms, or replacing misidentification with non-detection. However, we show that other improvements in attribution can backfire, weakening deterrence—these include detecting more attacks where the attacker is difficult to identify or pursuing too much certainty in attribution. Deterrence is improved if the defender can commit to a retaliatory strategy in advance, but the defender should not always commit to retaliate more after every signal.

scholarly journals Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Vives
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Complementarity

Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy, and the Optimal Degree of Publicity

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN G. JAMES ◽  
PHILLIP LAWLER
Keyword(s):  
Stabilization Policy ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Optimal Degree
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