How Does Better Access to Public Firm Disclosures Affect Private Firm Financing?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Shi
Keyword(s):  
Private Firm ◽  
Firm Financing ◽  
Public Firm

scholarly journals Does the CEO effect on performance differ in private versus public firms?

2021 ◽  
pp. 147612702110181
Author(s):  
Timothy J. Quigley ◽  
Francesco Chirico ◽  
Massimo Baù
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
Matched Pair ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Firm Profitability ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Privately Held Firms ◽  
Privately Held

Scholars have long debated the effect CEOs have on firm performance, including a focus on how their effect shifts across industries, national settings, and time. Unexplored, however, is the possibility that the CEO effect might differ in publicly traded versus privately held firms. Drawing on a unique longitudinal sample of both publicly traded and large, privately held Swedish firms from 1997 to 2013, we replicate and build upon prior CEO effects studies and find that private-firm CEOs have a greater effect on firm performance, for good or for ill, than do their public firm counterparts. Our results are strengthened after controlling for industry, firm profitability, and size in a matched-pair sample. We discuss the implications and potential future research stemming from these findings.

Mixed Duopoly Stochastic Sales Model with Advertising and Experience Gains for the Public and Foreign Competitors

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 662-667
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Kalashnikov ◽  
Natalyia Kalashnykova ◽  
Petr Kuzmin ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control Variable ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
The State ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Owned Company ◽  
Foreign Competitors

In this research, we propose a stochastic model with the finite horizon of time for sales competition between the state-owned company and private (foreign) competitor. We assume that the foreign company objective function is to maximize revenues and the state-owned agent is concerned about welfare maximization. There are many stochastic models for sales, but what is new in our case is that we assume mixed oligopoly and have different types of firms: private and state owned. They have somewhat different objective functions. As a control variable, we take the advertisement expenses of the private firm. Sale bursts rate depends and the advertisement expenditure and experience stock gained. For the public firm, we assume that advertising efforts are fixed. It means that the optimal control is to maximize private firm revenues taking into account possible uncertainties of stochastic profit flow using Bellman’s optimality condition. We can find out that the Advertisement-Experience (AE) efforts of the private firm are increasing if sales are increasing. Next, the AE might decrease if the experience level of the private firm increases and we have a sales burst. To optimize the governmental policies, we check for optimal AE effort of the public firm so the social welfare achieves the maximum value.

scholarly journals Privatization, pollution, and welfare in a mixed differentiated duopoly

2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi ◽  
Yiwen Guan
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
Degree Of Substitution ◽  
Extra Cost ◽  
The Public ◽  
Environmental Preference ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
The Government

This paper investigates the impacts exerted by the residents? environmental preference on privatization in a mixed differentiated duopoly. We assume that the production will generate environmental pollution, which causes an extra cost that the private firm does not bear but residents with the environmental preference have to tolerate. The government pursues to maximize social welfare. We find that the residents? environmental preference has significant impacts on privatization. When residents pay more attention to environmental pollution, privatization cannot induce more social welfare, and thus the government will choose not to privatize the public firm. The degree of substitution of products will affect the results when the value of the residents? environmental preference is given, but the order of the firms? moves will not change the results.

Institutional logic dynamics: private firm financing in Ningbo (1912–2008)

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiuping Hua ◽  
Yuhuilin Chen ◽  
Shameen Prashantham
Keyword(s):  
Private Firm ◽  
Institutional Logic ◽  
Firm Financing

scholarly journals Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aiyuan Tao ◽  
Yingjun Zhu ◽  
Xiangqing Zou
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Market Leader ◽  
Welfare Comparison ◽  
Total Welfare

In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. This paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the leader. It is found that the fact that which firm is the leader affects total welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market leader.

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