China actively broadens its channels for environmental protection and limits pollutant emissions through industrial structure adjustment and technical progress. Based on panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2003 to 2017, this study investigated the effects of industrial structure adjustment and technical progress on environmental pollution using spatial Dubin models. The findings show the following. (1) As the economy develops, the situation of environmental pollution in various regions deteriorates; moreover, spatio-temporal dependence is an aspect of environmental pollution. (2) Industrial structure adjustment and technical progress are beneficial to environmental improvement. Furthermore, there are spillover effects in factors such as industrial structure and technical progress to varying degrees. Thus, this study suggests that the path of coupling between industrial structure and technical progress should be explored to establish a pollution filtering mechanism, thereby improving environmental quality.
Recently, more and more researchers are resorting to green methods and techniques to avoid environmental pollution. Accordingly, many researchers have been working on the development of new green synthetic procedures trying to avoid the use of toxic organic solvents. A sustainable concept of green and environmentally friendly solvents in chemical synthesis nowadays encompasses a relatively new generation of solvents called deep eutectic solvents (DESs). DESs often have a dual role in the synthesis, acting as both, solvents and catalysts. In this study, DESs are used in the Knoevenagel synthesis of rhodanine derivatives, with no addition of conventional catalysts. A model reaction of rhodanine and salicylaldehyde was performed in 20 different DESs at 80 °C, in order to find the best solvent, which was further used for the synthesis of the series of desired compounds. A series of rhodanines was synthesized in choline chloride: acetamide (ChCl:acetamide) DES with good to excellent yields (51.4 – 99.7 %).
AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.