scholarly journals Privatization, pollution, and welfare in a mixed differentiated duopoly

2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi ◽  
Yiwen Guan
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
Degree Of Substitution ◽  
Extra Cost ◽  
The Public ◽  
Environmental Preference ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
The Government

This paper investigates the impacts exerted by the residents? environmental preference on privatization in a mixed differentiated duopoly. We assume that the production will generate environmental pollution, which causes an extra cost that the private firm does not bear but residents with the environmental preference have to tolerate. The government pursues to maximize social welfare. We find that the residents? environmental preference has significant impacts on privatization. When residents pay more attention to environmental pollution, privatization cannot induce more social welfare, and thus the government will choose not to privatize the public firm. The degree of substitution of products will affect the results when the value of the residents? environmental preference is given, but the order of the firms? moves will not change the results.

Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingliang Chen ◽  
Jie Shuai
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Location Model ◽  
Transport Cost ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Type Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
The Government

AbstractThis paper examines a different way of privatization from existing literature. In a mixed duopoly Hotelling type model in which the public firm consists of multiple subsidiaries, instead of privatizing the public firm as its entirety, the government may privatize only one of the subsidiaries (for example the manufacturing subsidiary). We find that this kind of privatization always improves social welfare comparing to no privatization at all. And comparing to privatizing the public firm in its entirety, privatizing only the manufacturing subsidiary always results in larger consumer welfare and results in larger social welfare when transport cost or R&D cost is sufficiently large.

GOOD GOVERNANCE, AKUNTANSI PEMERINTAHAN DAN EKONOMI KERAKYATAN

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuskar Yuskar
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Financial Economic ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

Good governance is a ware to create an efficient, effective and accountable government by keeping a balanced interaction well between government, private sector and society role. The implementation of a good governance is aimed to recover the public trust for the government that has been lost for the last several years because of financial, economic and trust crisis further multidimensional crisis. The Misunderstanding concept and unconcerned manner of government in implementing a good governance lately have caused unstability, deviation and injustice for Indonesia society. This paper is a literature study explaining a concept, principles and characteristics of a good governance. Furthermore, it explains the definition, development and utility of an efficient, effective and accountable government in creating a good governance mechanism having a strong impact to the democratic economy and social welfare. It also analyzes the importance of government concern for improving democratic economy suitable with human and natural resources and the culture values of Indonesia.

scholarly journals Sustainable and Optimal “Uniqueness” Contract in Public-Private Partnership Projects of Transportation Infrastructure

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yingjun Zhu ◽  
Zhitong Gao ◽  
Ruihai Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Transportation Infrastructure ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Equilibrium Relation ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Welfare Losses ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

To control the “uniqueness” risk in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects of transportation infrastructure, we design a simplified “uniqueness” contract model by incorporating the impact of the initial investment which is based on the Bertrand model. The nonlinear programming method is adopted to derive the optimal “uniqueness” contracts for incumbent private capital, the public, and the social welfare, respectively. The simulation results show that the achievement of the optimal “uniqueness” contract is essentially the result of a compromise between the private capital, the public, and social welfare. The extent to which such a contract reduces the probability of “uniqueness” risk mainly depends on the equilibrium relation between the interests of private capital and the public. The initial investment is not related to the government default when the contract does not take into account the interests of the private capital. Furthermore, the “uniqueness” contracts between private capital and the government are mainly for anticompetitive purpose in the PPP market of transportation infrastructure. Unless the contract terms focus on the improvement of social welfare, entering a “uniqueness” contract will cause social welfare losses.

scholarly journals Privatisation or State Ownership When Labour Market is Unionised?

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Labour Market ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Unexpected Result ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Communist Countries

AbstractThis paper analyses the choice of the bargaining agenda in a public/private unionised monopoly, and investigates whether the traditional higher efficiency of the state ownership of a monopoly holds when the labour market is unionised. First, we find that both a private and public monopoly always adopts a Right-to-Manage agenda. Second, a public firm pays a higher wage. Third, we show that privatisation could ensure a higher social welfare. This rather unexpected result may emerge provided that the Government has a high evaluation of the workers’ welfare, and the union is strong and/or wage aggressive. Therefore, our results suggest that privatisation 1) should be socially preferred depending only on the strength and wage aggressiveness of unions, and 2) rather paradoxically, is preferred when the Government is more careful about workers’ welfare. Our results may have policy implications especially in the post-communist countries, where the debate on privatisation is ubiquitously high and, differently between various countries, Government and unions may oscillate between left- or right-wing, and strength or weakness, respectively.

Environmental Pollution in China

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Great Cost ◽  
Public Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Past ◽  
Car Market ◽  
The Government ◽  
Material Progress

When Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms in the late 1970s, few would have imagined what the next four decades would bring. China’s GDP has grown on average nearly 10 percent annually since, and its economy is now the second largest in the world. Forty years ago, the Flying Pigeon bicycle ruled the roads; today, China is the world’s largest car market. And if forty years ago you looked out across the Huangpu River from the Bund in Shanghai, you would have seen farmland and a few warehouses and wharves; now you see the stunning, futuristic cityscape of Pudong. The material progress of the past forty years has been staggering-a source of pride for the Chinese people, as well as a source of legitimacy for the ruling Chinese Communist Party. But that progress has come at great cost: the extreme pollution of China’s air, water, and soil has taken a stark toll on human health. In Environmental Pollution in China: What Everyone Needs to Know®, Daniel K. Gardner examines the range of factors-economic, social, political, and historical-contributing to the degradation of China’s environment. He also covers the public response to the widespread pollution; the measures the government is taking to clean up the environment; and the country’s efforts to lessen its dependence on fossil fuels and develop clean sources of energy. Concise, accessible, and authoritative, this book serves as an ideal primer on one of the world’s most challenging environmental crises.

Privatization, Unemployment, and Welfare in the Harris-Todaro Model with a Mixed Duopoly

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi ◽  
Jun Yin
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Unemployment Rate ◽  
Relative Degree ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Partial Privatization ◽  
The Public ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Short Run

Abstract This paper explores the unemployment and welfare effects of privatization through the Harris-Todaro model with a mixed duopoly. Our approach is more generalized than the existing literature. When capital is sector-specific (i. e., it is in the short run), an increase in the degree of partial privatization will raise the unemployment rate, but the change of social welfare is conditional on the market share of the public firm and the relative degree of partial privatization. When capital is sector-mobile (i. e., it is in the long run), an increase in the degree of partial privatization will reduce the unemployment rate, but the change of social welfare is also dependent on the market share of the public firm and the relative degree of partial privatization. Our results capture the fact that the public firm and the private firm usually coexist in a competitive environment in the real world.

scholarly journals PENGANGGURAN SERTA DAMPAKNYA TERHADAP PERTUMBUHAN DAN PEMBANGUNAN EKONOMI

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-105
Author(s):  
Devit Prasetyo Sejati
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Growth And Development ◽  
Economic Growth And Development ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Unemployment in indonesia must be resolved immediately because it greatly affects economic growth and development. The impact of unemployment spreads to all sectors of the economy. Unemployment is also an obstacle in the process of economic development. How could we not feel the impact now. The economi is in decline, poverty is everywhere which ultimately results in a lack of social welfare and hinders economic growth. Moreover, Indonesia is a country that isstill developing. Problems like this must be resolved immediately with various policies from the government. In addition, there must also be a willingness from the public to move forward to reduce unemployment in order to create social welfare and improved economic growth.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

THE RELATIVE-PROFIT-MAXIMIZATION OBJECTIVE OF PRIVATE FIRMS AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 203-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
YUANZHU LU
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Endogenous Timing ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Marginal Costs ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Relative Profit

This paper investigates whether the relative-profit-maximization objective of private firms affects endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. Assuming firms have constant marginal costs and symmetric private firms are more efficient than the public firm, it is found that such an objective does not affect endogenous timing compared with the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a leader, social welfare increases compared with the level in the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a follower, social welfare remains unchanged.

Mixed Duopoly Stochastic Sales Model with Advertising and Experience Gains for the Public and Foreign Competitors

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 662-667
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Kalashnikov ◽  
Natalyia Kalashnykova ◽  
Petr Kuzmin ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control Variable ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
The State ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Owned Company ◽  
Foreign Competitors

In this research, we propose a stochastic model with the finite horizon of time for sales competition between the state-owned company and private (foreign) competitor. We assume that the foreign company objective function is to maximize revenues and the state-owned agent is concerned about welfare maximization. There are many stochastic models for sales, but what is new in our case is that we assume mixed oligopoly and have different types of firms: private and state owned. They have somewhat different objective functions. As a control variable, we take the advertisement expenses of the private firm. Sale bursts rate depends and the advertisement expenditure and experience stock gained. For the public firm, we assume that advertising efforts are fixed. It means that the optimal control is to maximize private firm revenues taking into account possible uncertainties of stochastic profit flow using Bellman’s optimality condition. We can find out that the Advertisement-Experience (AE) efforts of the private firm are increasing if sales are increasing. Next, the AE might decrease if the experience level of the private firm increases and we have a sales burst. To optimize the governmental policies, we check for optimal AE effort of the public firm so the social welfare achieves the maximum value.

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