scholarly journals Rising Allowances, Rising Rates: A Tinbergen Rule for Capital Taxation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Clemens ◽  
Werner Röger
Keyword(s):  



2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Saez ◽  
Stefanie Stantcheva


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng-Wei Chang ◽  
Ching-Chong Lai

This paper extends the Chamley–Judd framework by introducing preference externalities in a neoclassical growth model, and finds that the optimal capital tax increases with the extent of social-status seeking or negative leisure externalities. Furthermore, this paper finds that differences in leisure externalities lead to a distinct impact on optimal factor income taxes, and hence may serve as a plausible vehicle to explain the empirical differences in factor income taxation in the United States and Europe.





1980 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. H. Peters
Keyword(s):  


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 207-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping-ho Chen ◽  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Hsun Chu ◽  
Ching-chong Lai






2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongzheng Liu ◽  
Jie Mao

China initiated a major reform for capital taxation in 2004. Completed in 2009, it introduced permanent tax incentives for firms’ investment in fixed assets. We explore a unique firm-level dataset from years 2005–2012 and utilize a quasi-experimental design to test the impacts of the reform on firms’ investment and productivity. We find that, on average, the reform raised investment and productivity of the treated firms relative to the control firms by 38.4 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. We also show that the positive effects tend to be strengthened for firms with financial constraints. (JEL D24, D25, G31, H25, O25, P31, P35)



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