Quantity Adjustment Costs and Price Rigidity

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Svejstrup Hansen
2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 57-69
Author(s):  
Robert Somogyi ◽  
János Vincze

The phenomenon of infrequent price changes has troubled economists for decades. Intuitively one feels that for most price-setters there exists a range of inaction, i.e., a substantial measure of the states of the world, within which they do not wish to modify prevailing prices. Economists wishing to maintain rationality of price-setters resorted to fixed price adjustment costs as an explanation for price rigidity. This paper proposes an alternative explanation, without recourse to any sort of physical adjustment cost, by putting strategic interaction into the center-stage of the analysis. Price-making is treated as a repeated oligopoly game. The traditional analysis of these games cannot pinpoint any equilibrium as a reasonable “solution” of the strategic situation. Thus, decision-makers have a genuine strategic uncertainty about the strategies of other decision-makers. Hesitation may lead to inaction. To model this situation, the authors follow the style of agent-based models, by modeling firms that change their pricing strategies following an evolutionary algorithm. In addition to reproducing the known negative relationship between price rigidity and the level of general inflation, the model exhibits several features observed in real data. Moreover, most prices fall into the theoretical “range” without explicitly building this property into strategies.


Author(s):  
Robert Somogyi ◽  
János Vincze

The phenomenon of infrequent price changes has troubled economists for decades. Intuitively one feels that for most price-setters there exists a range of inaction, i.e., a substantial measure of the states of the world, within which they do not wish to modify prevailing prices. Economists wishing to maintain rationality of price-setters resorted to fixed price adjustment costs as an explanation for price rigidity. This paper proposes an alternative explanation, without recourse to any sort of physical adjustment cost, by putting strategic interaction into the center-stage of the analysis. Price-making is treated as a repeated oligopoly game. The traditional analysis of these games cannot pinpoint any equilibrium as a reasonable “solution” of the strategic situation. Thus, decision-makers have a genuine strategic uncertainty about the strategies of other decision-makers. Hesitation may lead to inaction. To model this situation, the authors follow the style of agent-based models, by modeling firms that change their pricing strategies following an evolutionary algorithm. In addition to reproducing the known negative relationship between price rigidity and the level of general inflation, the model exhibits several features observed in real data. Moreover, most prices fall into the theoretical “range” without explicitly building this property into strategies.


1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-260
Author(s):  
Christoph R. Weiss

1991 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Ginsburgh ◽  
Philippe Michel ◽  
Philippe Moës

1995 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 343-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torben M. Andersen

2009 ◽  
pp. 54-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko ◽  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
S. Golovanova

The analysis of competition policy under economic crisis is motivated by the fact that competition is a key factor for the level of productivity. The latter, in its turn, influences the scope and length of economic recession. In many Russian markets buyers' gains decline because of the weakness of competition, since suppliers are reluctant to cut prices in spite of the decreasing demand. Data on prices in Russia and abroad in the second half of 2008 show asymmetric price rigidity. At least two questions are important under economic crisis: the 'division of labor' between pro-active and protective tools of competition policy and the impact of anti-crisis policy on competition. Protective competition policy is insufficient in transition economy, especially in the days of crisis it should be supplemented with the well-designed industrial policy measures which do not contradict the goals of competition. The preferable tools of anti-crisis policy are also those that do not restrain competition.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Maria Barrero

This paper studies how biases in managerial beliefs affect managerial decisions, firm performance, and the macroeconomy. Using a new survey of US managers I establish three facts. (1) Managers are not over-optimistic: sales growth forecasts on average do not exceed realizations. (2) Managers are overprecise (overconfident): they underestimate future sales growth volatility. (3) Managers overextrapolate: their forecasts are too optimistic after positive shocks and too pessimistic after negative shocks. To quantify the implications of these facts, I estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model in which managers of heterogeneous firms use a subjective beliefs process to make forward-looking hiring decisions. Overprecision and overextrapolation lead managers to overreact to firm-level shocks and overspend on adjustment costs, destroying 2.1 percent of the typical firm’s value. Pervasive overreaction leads to excess volatility and reallocation, lowering consumer welfare by 0.5 to 2.3 percent relative to the rational expectations equilibrium. These findings suggest overreaction may amplify asset-price and business cycle fluctuations.


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