Epistemology & the Law of Evidence: Four Doubts About Alex Stein's Foundations of Evidence Law

Author(s):  
Amit Pundik
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 645-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Jackson ◽  
Sean Doran

It is a curious quirk of legal scholarship that so much attention has been devoted to the rules and procedures that operate injury trials and so little to the way in which these rules and procedures operate in the vast majority of trials which are conducted without a jury. This “jury-centredness” as it has been called was noted almost thirty years ago by the American scholar Kenneth Culp Davis when he urged scholars and the legal profession to escape from the deep-seated habit of allowing all thinking about evidence law to be dominated by the needs of the 3% of trials that involve juries and to think instead about the needs of the remaining 97% of trials that are tried without a jury. It is certainly true that the withdrawal of the jury from many categories of cases throughout this century in many jurisdictions has not been accompanied by any instant changes in the law of evidence. Certain commentators have noted that in spite of Thayer's claim that the rules are the “child of the jury”, the rules of evidence have proved remarkably resilient in outlasting the demise of the jury. The parent may have ceased to exist in many legal proceedings but the child has lived on.


2021 ◽  
pp. 349-363
Author(s):  
Justin Sevier

Empirical psychology is a natural fit for understanding the law of evidence but is also substantially at odds with it. Since the early twentieth century, researchers have begun applying the insights from experimental psychology to various aspects of courtroom adjudication, including the assumptions underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence and the effects of the rules on litigants and the public. At the same time, the law has struggled with whether and how to incorporate insights from an academic discipline that embodies goals and methodologies that are, in many ways, dramatically different from its own. This chapter unfolds a brief historical account of the relationship between empirical psychology and the law of evidence, specifies the major contributions that psychologists have made to our understanding of evidence law, highlights recent, cutting-edge research, and makes several suggestions for how future research can assist in maintaining the relevance of psychology to sound evidentiary policy.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-396
Author(s):  
Fraser Davidson
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

1987 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand Schoeman

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-120
Author(s):  
’Mampolokeng ’Mathuso Mary-Elizabet Monyakane

AbstractThe Prima facie view regarding the admissibility of admissions, as evidence, in criminal matters is that, to admit admissions as evidence, the court requires a single consideration as to whether the admission was made freely and voluntarily. Without too much ado, the simple view to this understanding presupposes that admission of an admission as evidence against its maker is of a lesser danger compared to the admission of a confession. The admissibility of confessions against their makers does not come as easily as that of admissions. There are many prescribed requirements to satisfy before confessions are admitted as evidence. This comparison has led to a questionable conclusion that requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity equated to the requirements for the admission of confessions. This paper answers the question whether an inference that the requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity compared to the requirements for the admission of confessions is rational? It equates this approach to the now done away with commonwealth states rigid differentiation perspective. In the 1800s the commonwealth states, especially those vowing on the Wigmorian perspective on the law of evidence, developed from a rigid interpretation of confessions and admissions and adopted a relaxed and wide definitions of the word, “confession.” To this extent there was a relaxed divide between confessions and admissions hence their common classification and application of similar cautionary rules. The article recounts admissibility requirement in section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (Hereinafter CPA). It then analyses Section 219A of the CPA requirement in the light of the rationale encompassing precautions for the admission of confessions in terms of 217(1) of the CPA. It exposes the similarities of potential prejudices where confessions and admissions are admitted as evidence. It reckons that by the adherence to this rigid differentiation perspectives of confessions and admissions which used to be the practice in the commonwealth prior the 1800s developments, South African law of evidence remains prejudicial to accused persons. To do away with these prejudices this article, recommends that section 219A be amended to include additional admissibility requirements in section 217(1). In effect it recommends the merging of sections 217(1) and 219A of the CPA.


1955 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 365
Author(s):  
James H. Chadbourn ◽  
Charles T. McCormick
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

1927 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Elbert B. Hamlin ◽  
Edmund M. Morgan ◽  
Zechariah Chafee ◽  
Ralph W. Gifford ◽  
Edward W. Hinton ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 222-232
Author(s):  
D.Kh. VALEEV ◽  
N.N. MAKOLKIN

This article is an attempt to briefly analyze the scientific activity of Mikhail Konstantinovich Treushnikov, which is carried out through the prism of his publication activity in all its manifestations. In addition, this study presents an attempt to collect a complete bibliography of M.K. Treushnikov. The significance of this study is determined both by its uniqueness, which is due to the use of information from various sources, and the presence of individual theses and conclusions formulated by the authors. Thus, this work focuses on the fact that M.K. Treushnikov, in addition to considering the problems of civil and arbitral procedural law, paid attention to the development of problems of higher education, including in terms of methodology, and that, perhaps, allowed him to create a real school of civil procedure law in the walls of the Lomonosov Moscow State University. In addition, the thesis is put forward and substantiated that M.K. Treushnikov was actively engaged in questions of the law of evidence, as well as judicial law, which were widely reflected in his numerous works published in various journals and collections, as well as embodied in monographs.


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