scholarly journals Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Linear Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Barbieri ◽  
David A. Malueg
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Good Linear ◽  
Discrete Public Good

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Barbieri ◽  
David A. Malueg
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Discrete Public Good ◽  
Contribution Game

Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Barbieri ◽  
David A. Malueg
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Piecewise Linear ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Symmetric Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Discrete Public Good

We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not reach a threshold set by the seller of the good. We characterize the distributions of players' private values that can support a symmetric equilibrium in continuous piecewise-linear strategies, and we calculate these strategies. Allowing the seller to charge an entry fee before players make their private contributions, we show these piecewise-linear equilibrium strategies maximize the seller's expected profit over all incentive compatible selling mechanisms.

scholarly journals Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael McBride
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Discrete Public Good ◽  
Threshold Uncertainty ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Environmental incentives facing private information

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Franz Wirl
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Degree Of Freedom ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Information Parameter ◽  
Benefit Cost ◽  
Distinct Features

Abstract Environmental incentives are characterized by two distinct features: (1) a benefit-cost trade-off; and (2) private information about the trade-off. This suggests a degree of freedom of where to attach the private information, either to the benefit or the costs, as long as these choices imply the same behavior absent incentives (‘observation equivalent’). However, we show that different observation equivalent specifications can lead to different incentives. This is demonstrated for two cases: rainforest protection and contributions to a public good. Therefore, the choice of a private information parameter must be justified against observation equivalent alternatives.

scholarly journals Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information

2014 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-500
Author(s):  
Murat Yılmaz
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Discrete Public Good

Finite Horizon Game for Voluntary Provision of a Discrete Public Good

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550005
Author(s):  
Shizuka Nishikawa
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Symmetric Case ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cost Structures ◽  
Asymmetric Costs ◽  
Discrete Public Good ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Made In

This paper analyzes a dynamic game for the provision of a discrete public good that will be provided only when a certain number of contributions are made. In each period players are randomly ordered and each player decides whether to contribute or not to the provision of the public good. If not enough contributions are made to provide the public good, the game goes to the next period and continue until the public good is either provided or the game ends at the final period. The paper first assumes symmetric players and shows that the exact period in which the public good will be provided is determined under subgame-perfect equilibria and that for some cost structures there will be a delay in provision of the public good. Counterintuitively, in some cases the public good is provided earlier at higher costs than at lower costs. The paper then introduces a partial public good, which requires fewer contributions to be provided but has a smaller value. We show that for some costs, introducing the partial public good eliminates the possibility of providing any kind of public good. For other cost structures, introducing the partial public good may improve social welfare. At last, asymmetric costs are introduced. The results are similar to the symmetric case.

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