The Impact Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms On Earnings Quality: Evidence From Egypt

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-108
Author(s):  
صلاح عبدالحفیظ مصطفى على ◽  
عبدالمحسن محمد الدسوقی
Author(s):  
Xu_Dong Ji ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Wei Lu

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.


Author(s):  
G. M. Wali Ullah ◽  
Sarwar Uddin Ahmed ◽  
Samiul Parvez Ahmed ◽  
Kazi Md. Jamshed

Corporate Governance refers to the way an organization is directed, administrated or controlled. It includes the set of rules and regulations that affect the manager's decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by the current and potential stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also decision-making assistance on corporate affairs. Corporate governance practices in Bangladesh are gradually being introduced in most companies and organizations (Du, 2006). However, Bangladesh has fallen behind its neighboring countries and global economy in corporate governance (Gillibrand, 2004). Corporate governance structure is mainly considered ambiguous. Specific governance structures or practices will not necessarily fit all companies at all times. Firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms are generally associated with better financial performance, higher firm valuation and higher stock returns. Unfortunately, investors in Bangladesh have a little information about how these corporate values affect the performance of the Multinational Companies (MNCs). This study aims to provide a quantitative contribution to the literature by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance from the perspective of MNCs. A panel data based Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression model was used to measure the quantitative significance of various corporate governance related variables on MNC performance, as identified through a detailed literature review.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Mejbel Al-Saidi

The study investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the corporate capital structure of the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE). Specifically, this study linked five corporate governance mechanisms—large shareholder ownership concentration, government ownership concentration, board size, board independence, and family directors—with capital structure for 81 non-financial listed firms between 2017 and 2018. The data indicated that only government ownership concentration and family directors affect capital structure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (10) ◽  
pp. 2740-2757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atreya Chakraborty ◽  
Lucia Gao ◽  
Shahbaz Sheikh

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies). Design/methodology/approach Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms. Findings Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms. Practical implications This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures. Originality/value Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-525
Author(s):  
Nischay Arora ◽  
Balwinder Singh

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. board structure and ownership structure on the underpricing of small and medium enterprises (SME) IPOs in India. Design/methodology/approach Most of the extant empirical research studies have either pivoted on mainstream IPOs or SMEs IPOs in developed economies, but the present study examines 200 SME IPOs issued during Feb 2012 to April 2017. Multiple regressions have been used to examine the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms on raw return (RR). Furthermore, robustness of the results has been verified through the employment of market-adjusted excess return (MAER) as an additional proxy of underpricing. Findings The results highlight that board size, inverse of board committees, board independence, board age, board directorships positively, and top ten shareholding negatively influence RR. Further, direction of promoter ownership variable indicates curvilinear relationship with underpricing. Other explanatory variables used in model lack statistical validity. Similar results have been obtained when variables were regressed against MAER with related board members being additionally significant in model. Practical implications The findings suggest that Indian investors do take cues from board structure and ownership patterns for making investment decisions in small- and medium-sized firms. Further, the results are also helpful to top management in structuring their boards. Originality/value The present research enriches SME IPOs underpricing literature because the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on unadjusted returns is relatively under explored particularly within the context of small- and medium-sized firms.


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