scholarly journals Management of Information Risks for Complex System Using the «Cognitive Game» Mechanism

2020 ◽  
pp. 2-10
Author(s):  
Andrey Kalashnikov ◽  
◽  
Evgenia Anikina ◽  

Purpose of the article: development of mechanisms for solving problems of information risk management of complex systems in conditions of uncertainty and mutual influence of system elements on each other. Research method: game-theoretic mathematical modeling of risk management processes in complex systems based on arbitration schemes and multistep games on cognitive maps. The result: a general model of a complex system (for example, a heterogeneous computer network) is considered, within which the risk manager (risk-manager) carries out effective risk management by distributing the resource at his disposal among its elements (nodes of a computer network). To assess the state of the system elements, functions of local risk are proposed that satisfy certain specified requirements, and to assess the state of the system as a whole, an integral risk function is proposed. It is shown that in the case of independence (absence of mutual influence on each other) of the system elements to find an effective resource allocation, a game-theoretic approach can be used based on an arbitration scheme based on the principles of stimulation and non-suppression (MS-solution). For the case when changes in the level of risk for one element of the system can have a significant impact on the levels of risks of other elements, it is proposed to use game-theoretic models based on the MS-solution and a multistep “cognitive game”.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vassiliki Mpelogianni ◽  
Ioannis Arvanitakis ◽  
Peter Groumpos

Complex systems have become a research area with increasing interest over the last years. The emergence of new technologies, the increase in computational power with reduced resources and cost, the integration of the physical world with computer based systems has created the possibility of significantly improving the quality of life of humans. While a significant degree of automation within these systems exists and has been provided in the past decade with examples of the smart homes and energy efficient buildings, a paradigm shift towards autonomy has been noted. The need for autonomy requires the extraction of a model; while a strict mathematical formulation usually exists for the individual subsystems, finding a complete mathematical formulation for the complex systems is a near impossible task to accomplish. For this reason, methods such as the Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) have emerged that are able to provide with a description of the complex system. The system description results from empirical observations made from experts in the related subject – integration of expert’s knowledge – that provide the required cause-effect relations between the interacting components that the FCM needs in order to be formulated. Learning methods are employed that are able to improve the formulated model based on measurements from the actual system. The FCM method, that is able to inherently integrate uncertainties, is able to provide an adequate model for the study of a complex system. With the required system model, the next step towards the development of a autonomous systems is the creation of a control scheme. While FCM can provide with a system model, the system representation proves inadequate to be utilized to design classic model based controllers that require a state space or frequency domain representation. In state space representation, the state vector contains the variables of the system that can describe enough about the system to determine its future behavior in absence of external variables. Thus, within the components – the nodes of the FCM, ideally those can be identified that constitute the state vector of the system. In this work the authors propose the creation of a state feedback control law of complex systems via Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. Given the FCM representation of a system, initially the components-states of the system are identified. Given the identified states, a FCM representation of the controller occurs where the controller parameters are the weights of the cause-effect relations of the system. The FCM of the system then is augmented with the FCM of the controller. An example of the proposed methodology is given via the use of the cart-pendulum system, a common benchmark system for testing the efficiency of control systems.


Author(s):  
Shaohan Feng ◽  
Wenbo Wang ◽  
Zehui Xiong ◽  
Dusit Niyato ◽  
Ping Wang ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Mahsa Moosakhaani ◽  
Lida Salimi ◽  
Mohammad Taghi Sadatipour ◽  
Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan ◽  
Mohammad Rabbani

2007 ◽  
pp. 355-387
Author(s):  
Thorsten Blecker ◽  
Wolfgang Kersten ◽  
Hagen Spath ◽  
Birit Koeppen

This chapter introduces a game-theoretic approach to supply chain risk management. The focus of this study lies on the risk of a single supply chain member defecting from common supply chain agreements, thereby jeopardizing the overall supply chain performance. The chapter goes on to introduce a manual supply chain game, by which dynamic supply chain mechanisms can be simulated and further analyzed using a game-theoretic model. With the help of the game-theoretic model, externalities are identified that negatively impact supply chain efficiency. The conclusion drawn from this chapter is that incentives are necessary to overcome these externalities in order to align supply chain objectives. The authors show that the game-theoretic model, in connection with the supply chain game presented, provides an informative basis for the future development of incentives by which supply chains can be aligned in order to reduce supply chain risks.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-195
Author(s):  
Karim Khan

Since the recent advances in the institutional perspective of economic development, there is considerable increase in the literature on the evolution of institutions. In this study, while employing the game theoretic approach, we explore the rent-seeking fundamentals of institutions. We model the manner in which the rent-seeking behaviour of state actors results in inefficiency of the institutional framework. The main focus is on the rents provided by the availability of natural resources wealth, foreign aid or corruption potential. By originating a framework where rulers, agents of the state, and citizens act endogenously, we show that the rents from these resources can be a significant constraint to institutional reforms. In order to come out of the bad institutions trap, the society needs to offer a substantial amount of incentives to the privileged groups. The focus is on two privileged groups, i.e. the rulers and the state agents. In most of the societies, these two groups have the highest bargaining power in the negotiations over the rules and institutions. JEL Classification:JEL Classification: P48, P16, P14, O43, D73 Institutional Reforms, Natural Resources Wealth, Foreign Aid,Corruption Potential, Rulers, Agents of the State


Author(s):  
Thorsten Blecker ◽  
Wolfgang Kersten ◽  
Hagen Späth ◽  
Birgit Koeppen

This chapter introduces a game-theoretic approach to supply chain risk management. The focus of this study lies on the risk of a single supply chain member defecting from common supply chain agreements, thereby jeopardizing the overall supply chain performance. The chapter goes on to introduce a manual supply chain game, by which dynamic supply chain mechanisms can be simulated and further analyzed using a game-theoretic model. With the help of the game-theoretic model, externalities are identified that negatively impact supply chain efficiency. The conclusion drawn from this chapter is that incentives are necessary to overcome these externalities in order to align supply chain objectives. The authors show that the game-theoretic model, in connection with the supply chain game presented, provides an informative basis for the future development of incentives by which supply chains can be aligned in order to reduce supply chain risks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 62-75
Author(s):  
A. V. Tikhonova

The article is devoted to the development of the concept of the state to manage its tax risks, based on a systematic approach. The author's concept presupposes the presence of the following elements logically arranged according to the principle "from the general to the particular": 1) mechanisms for managing tax risks, 2) disclosing methodological recommendations, 3) specific proposals for changing legislation. To achieve this goal, the author used general scientific methods (deduction and induction, analysis and synthesis, observation, description, generalization) and private scientific methods of cognition (comparison method, graphical and tabular data presentation methods). We have presented a brief overview of the main tax risks of the Russian Federation in the current economic environment, which are classified in four areas: 1) risks in the field of value added taxation; 2) risks in the field of taxation of profits and income; 3) risks, the source of which is Russia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union; 4) customs risks. The author presents a general scheme of tax risk management by the state, which includes the context, goals and management strategy. The priority mechanisms for managing the tax risks of the state are formulated on the basis of the presented classification of tax risks. These areas include: introduction of an end-to-end product traceability system; substantiation of taxation methods; joint elimination of tax risks (Federal Tax Service, Federal Customs Service, Ministry of Labor, Federal Service for Financial Monitoring); optimization of tax administration costs on the part of both tax authorities and taxpayers; harmonization of indirect taxation, including duty-free trade; harmonization of international tax rules at the international level; selection of the most effective tools for eliminating multiple taxation. A draft "road map" has been developed to improve the management of state tax risks.


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