scholarly journals THE CHARTER REVOLUTION: IS IT UNDEMOCRATIC?

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter W. Hogg

A new book on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by two professors from the University of Calgary, F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, is entitled The Charter Revolution and the Court Party.1 By the “Charter revolution” the authors refer to the active law- making role assumed by the Supreme Court of Canada since the adoption of the Charter of Rights in 1982.2 By the “Court Party” they refer to a cluster of interest groups promoting Charter rights through litigation.3 The thesis of the book is that these groups have been successful in obtaining changes in the law from the Supreme Court of Canada that could not have been achieved in the representative legislative assemblies. That, they argue, is wrong because it is “undemocratic.”4 I agree that there has been a Charter revolution. I also agree that there is a Court Party, but I will argue that the cluster of interest groups using litigation as their strategy is much broader than the authors acknowledge. I also agree that the effects of these two phenomena have not been wholly beneficial, but I argue that, on the whole, the result is one that enhances rather than usurps a democratic dialogue.

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.


1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick

AbstractNow that the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has made the fact of judicial power so obvious, it is important to develop the conceptual vocabulary for describing and assessing this power. One such concept that has been applied to the study of United States and British appeal courts is the notion of “party capability theory,” which suggests that different types of litigant will enjoy different levels of success, as both appellant and respondent. Using a data base derived from all reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada between 1949 and 1992, this article applies party capability theory to the performance of Canada's highest court, and compares the findings with similar studies of American and British courts.


2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Berryman

The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly enunciated a distinct equity jurisprudence for Canada. This paper discusses certain aspects of the most recent developments particularly in the area of equitable remedies. The recent "explosion" in the use of Anton Piller decisions is charted, and where appropriate, analogous Commonwealth decisions are discussed. The use of Injunctive remedies is canvassed, as well as specific performance.


1969 ◽  
pp. 861
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick

This paper reports the results of a statistical survey of the success rates of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeals from all provinces were examined, but in his analysis Professor McCormick focuses on the Alberta Court of Appeal. The variables he discusses include the geographic and political composition of the Supreme Court, the mix of cases from different areas of the law, the length of experience of Court of Appeal judges, and the presence or absence of dissenting opinions.


1969 ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
D. C. McDonald

The speaker noted that the Hon. Emmett Hall, for whom he was substituting, had had experience as trial judge, quality he considers desirable in the appellate courts. He then commented on some of the very early cases of the S.C.C., before proceeding to discussion of Dean Friaman's paper. The speaker discussed aspects in the development of the law relating to trespassers and occupier's liability. He was of the opinion that the S.C.C. was not as mechanistic in its approach to the law of tort as Dean Fridman thought it to be. In commenting on Dr. Beaudoin's presentation, Mr. Justice McDonald noted that the blame for the lack of weight given to French decisions in matters concerning the Quebec Civil Code droit de delits should not be attributed to the S.C.C. but to the Privy Council. In concluding, His Lordship observed that the process of applying for have to appeal to the S.C.C. deserves further study, since the present requirement that the Court dispose of applications for leave which are not accompanied by an oral submis sion increases the cost of appeal particularly for Western cases.


Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Audrey Macklin

In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Ahani v. MCI, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that removing a refugee accused of terrorism to a country where he or she would face a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse would virtually always violate the individual’s rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the Court deserves praise for vindicating fundamental human rights over competing claims of national security, coming so close on the heels of September 11, the victory is in certain respects more apparent than real. Given the strong endorsement of judicial deference to the exercise of Ministerial discretion in national security matters, the Court leaves the state wide scope to circumvent the spirit of the judgment while adhering to its letter.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document