Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy in New-Keynesian Models with Inertia

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
George W Evans ◽  
Bruce McGough
2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (S1) ◽  
pp. 58-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Gavin ◽  
Benjamin D. Keen ◽  
Michael R. Pakko

This paper shows that the optimal monetary policies recommended by New Keynesian models still imply a large amount of inflation risk. We calculate the term structure of inflation uncertainty in New Keynesian models when the monetary authority adopts the optimal policy. When the monetary policy rules are modified to include some weight on a price path, the economy achieves equilibria with substantially lower long-run inflation risk. With either sticky prices or sticky wages, a price path target reduces the variance of inflation by an order of magnitude more than it increases the variability of the output gap.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 289-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hess Chung ◽  
Edward Herbst ◽  
Michael T. Kiley

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno ◽  
Gauti B. Eggertsson ◽  
Federica Romei

This paper proposes a postcrisis New Keynesian model that incorporates agent heterogeneity in borrowing and lending with a minimum set of assumptions. Unlike the standard framework, this model makes the natural rate of interest endogenous and dependent on macroeconomic policy. The main application is to study optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Such policy succeeds in raising the natural rate of interest by creating an environment that speeds up deleveraging and thus endogenously shortens the crisis and the duration of binding ZLB. Inflation should be front-loaded and should overshoot its long-term target during the ZLB episode. (JEL E12, E31, E32, E43, E52)


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1504-1526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Gerke ◽  
Felix Hammermann

We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be misspecified. We find that, first, whether robust optimal monetary policy under commitment responds more cautiously or more aggressively depends crucially on the source of shock. Imperfect pass-through amplifies the robust policy. Second, if the central bank is concerned about uncertainty, it dampens volatility in the inflation rate preemptively but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and loan rate. However, for highly sticky loan rates, insurance against model misspecification becomes particularly pricy. Third, if the central bank fears uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilization away from inflation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Ravenna

AbstractWe propose a method to assess the efficiency of macroeconomic outcomes using the restrictions implied by optimal policy DSGE models for the volatility of observable variables. The method exploits the variation in the model parameters, rather than random deviations from the optimal policy. In the new Keynesian business cycle model this approach shows that optimal monetary policy imposes tighter restrictions on the behavior of the economy than is readily apparent. The method suggests that for the historical output, inflation and interest rate volatility in the United States over the 1984–2005 period to be generated by any optimal monetary policy with a high probability, the observed interest rate time series should have a 25% larger variance than in the data.


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