scholarly journals Village elections, accountability and income distribution in rural China

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Village Elections

Income Distribution in Small Rural Chinese Communities

1976 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 797-816 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Blecher
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Income Distribution ◽  
Agricultural Development ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Modern China ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Rural Income ◽  
Interview Research ◽  
China Today ◽  
Modest Level

The issue of equality has become the focus of increasing attention in both China and the west in the past several years. But the empirical basis for analyzing the extent and nature of equality in modern China remains weak, relying as it has on impressions and scattered statistics brought back by visitors. The most systematic summary of available data on one form of equality – income distribution – is Professor Martin Whyte's recent article in The China Quarterly (No. 64) entitled “Inequality and stratification in China.” Whyte's measure of inequality is the ratio of the income of the highest earner to that of the lowest. In his treatment of rural income, Whyte reports intra-team ratios for 18 communes visited by Keith Buchanan as around 3:1, a ratio of 14:1 for Liu-lin village visited by Jan Myrdal in 1962, and 3:1 or 4:1 for villages in his own interview research. On the basis of this kind of data, Whyte concludes that income inequality within China's production teams is relatively low but not outstandingly so in comparison with pre-1949 China or with other Asian countries. He suggests that the “modest” level of income inequality in rural China today may be as much the result of a relatively equal distribution before 1949 as of post-Liberation agricultural development and redistribution of the means of production.

The Role of International ngos in the Development of Democracy in Rural China

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-187
Author(s):  
Dongshui Yin ◽  
Xiaoguang Guo
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Village Elections ◽  
Governmental Organizations ◽  
Non Governmental Organizations ◽  
International Ngos ◽  
Fast Movement ◽  
The Government

The involvement of international non-governmental organizations (ingos) in the efforts to develop democracy is a global phenomenon in the context of globalization. ingos have played a part in the development of democracy in rural China. Given domestic reformers’ technical need for village elections, the important role of village elections, and the vision of ingos for boosting democracy, ingos have sought cooperation with the government and reached where village elections are held with their resources to provide financial, technical, intellectual and other support for pushing forward elections and the reform. To some extent, these ingos have contributed to the development of democracy in rural China. However, the large-scale fast movement of people in China has resulted in a large number of “vacant” villages. Against such a backdrop, ingos have shown less interest in village elections and shifted some of their attention to other areas. In the process of developing democracy, China should adopt an open and rational attitude towards the ingos, take advantage of their strengths, and avoid considering them either angels or demons.

scholarly journals Vote Buying, Village Elections, and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroki Takeuchi
Keyword(s):  
Rural China ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Political Organizations ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Democratic Institution ◽  
Village Elections ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Democratic Reform ◽  
Game Theoretic

Village elections are a democratic institution in one of the most resilient authoritarian regimes in the world. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has promoted village elections over the past twenty years, but not elections at higher levels. I present a game-theoretic model in which candidates would engage in vote buying when competing in a small electorate but not when competing in a larger electorate. The model's equilibrium outcome implies that the logic of China's introduction of village elections inherently limits this democratic reform to the grassroots level. Elections for higher levels of government would be dangerous to the regime because they would lead candidates to create substantive policy platforms and political organizations. Thus, rather than being an experiment that has failed to lead to further reforms, village democracy is self-limiting by design.

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