scholarly journals Ownership monitoring mechanism and corporate performance: evidence from banking firms in Asian emerging markets

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-357
Author(s):  
Abdul Hadi Zulkafli ◽  
Fazilah Abdul Samad ◽  
Izani Ibrahim

Corporate governance is regarded as a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asia. These countries have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the protection of their shareholders and stakeholders interests. Such reforms may affect the conduct of business of all corporations in the region as it allows for greater monitoring especially by the shareholders. Unlike earlier studies which focused on non-financial firms, this study analyzes the corporate governance involving ownership monitoring mechanism of listed banking firms in nine Asian emerging markets which are Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and India. It is found that ownership monitoring mechanisms of the banking firms in Asian emerging markets are negatively related with firm value measured by Tobin’s Q

Author(s):  
Haseeb-Ur- Rahman ◽  
Mohd. Yussoff Ibrahim ◽  
Ayoib Che Ahmad

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation of corporate governance (CG) attributes, such as separate leadership (SL) structure, independent chair (IC) of the board, and the proportion of independent directors on the board (Bind) recommended by the new Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2012), with firms’ market performance measured by share market price. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses a randomly selected sample of 150 non-financial Malaysian listed companies. To find the distinct impact of the code, the paper explicitly divides the sample into two-year pre-context (2010-2011) and two-year post-context (2013-2014) of the code. Besides descriptive statistics, the study also employs correlation and multiple regression estimators. Findings By comparing the pre-context and post-context of the code, the study found that SL and Bind have a significant positive relation while IC of the board has a significant negative relation with share market price after enactment of the code. Research limitations/implications The paper has a limitation of using only two years of data due to its non-availability particularly after enactment of the code. The findings show that the new code slightly improved compliance to the CG attributes investigated. Based on findings, the study also recommends further improvement in compliance to CG codes and other voluntary regulations in Malaysia. Originality/value Besides contributing to the limited and incongruent literature in pre-context and post-context of CG regulations, the paper also provides important insights for regulators and policy makers of the emerging markets like Malaysia.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-141
Author(s):  
Omar Farooq

How does change in corporate governance regimes effect financial analysts? Are analysts able to incorporate the effect of better governance regimes in their recommendations? This paper aims to answer these questions by documenting the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of analysts‟ recommendations in Asian emerging markets during the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods. Using a large dataset of analyst recommendations, we document that analysts were not able to generate informative recommendations during the post-crisis period (better governance regime). We report that performance of analyst recommendations deteriorated significantly during the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period (poor governance regime). Our results indicate relative ineffectiveness of governance reforms initiated after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.


2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 839-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil

Purpose This study aims to examine the economic role of politics on corporate governance reforms in one of emerging market, namely, Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based upon a literature review analysis. Findings The Malaysian economic, political and social settings have resulted in undue state and detrimental political influence on business, and yet the corporate governance reforms undertaken seemed not be able to resolve the matter. It is suggesting that it would be beneficial for Malaysia to have more independent regulatory bodies representing a wide variety of stakeholders to improve the transparency and accountability to ensure that the reforms are effectively enforced without conflicting with the political agenda. Legal institutional reforms also may be needed to improve the structure, capacity and performance of judicial system, as it is capable to capture reliance of economic role of politics and promoting accountability in Malaysia. Research limitations/implications The economic role of politics on corporate governance reforms is merely to broaden the political strategy in the corporate sector as the change in politics can improve the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms. Moreover, the economic role of politics raises the tone of the corporate governance reforms, and it implies that policymakers need to have effective corporate governance strategy in dealing with the reforms initiatives in areas that have strong political interventions. Originality/value Regulatory and judicial implications are offered as a means to improve corporate governance in Malaysia.


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