scholarly journals Taking of hostages as an offense in international law and Serbian regulations

Temida ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-212
Author(s):  
Bajo Cmiljanic

In the development of international relations, hostage-taking was carried out as an insurance against fraud, not keeping obligations, or according to the rules of war law. Earlier taking hostages was more related to armed conflicts, and in modern times it is more related to terrorist acts in international terrorism. The taking of hostages is an international offense, which has its essential elements and characteristics. It is a crime punishable under the national legislation of many countries, and taking of hostages in armed conflicts is a war crime for which the International Criminal Court is responsible. International terrorism is manifested through a variety of terrorist acts, which, through fear and panic aim to achieve a political purpose. The range of these terrorist acts is wide and varied. One of these terrorist activities is the taking of hostages. As an offense established by the norms of international law, this unlawful act must be specifically investigated and clarified, which is the goal of this paper. This paper gives an overview of the features and elements of the offense in the light of international law and the laws of the Republic of Serbia.

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (912) ◽  
pp. 1091-1115
Author(s):  
Dustin A. Lewis

AbstractLegal controversies and disagreements have arisen about the timing and duration of numerous contemporary armed conflicts, not least regarding how to discern precisely when those conflicts began and when they ended (if indeed they have ended). The existence of several long-running conflicts – some stretching across decades – and the corresponding suffering that they entail accentuate the stakes of these debates. To help shed light on some select aspects of the duration of contemporary wars, this article analyzes two sets of legal issues: first, the notion of “protracted armed conflict” as formulated in a war-crimes-related provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and second, the rules, principles and standards laid down in international humanitarian law and international criminal law pertaining to when armed conflicts have come to an end. The upshot of the analysis is that under existing international law, there is no general category of “protracted armed conflict”; that the question of whether to pursue such a category raises numerous challenges; and that several dimensions of the law concerning the end of armed conflict are unsettled.


Legal Ukraine ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 42-47
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Bazov

The article presents an analysis of the principle of universal jurisdiction as an important legal institution of international criminal justice. Analyzed the main international legal norms and judicial practice in this area. The directions of further development of universal jurisdiction have been determined. Analyzed the Princeton Principlesof the universal jurisdiction. Investigated the work of the UN International Law Commission and the UN General Assembly on this issue. Proposals for the improvement of international and national legal acts are presented. Universal jurisdiction or the principle of universality in the fight against international crime is an important legal institution in the activities of both national and international criminal courts. As with any international offense, the obligation to stop international crimes such as aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of international terrorism take the form of an alternative to aut dedere aut judicare or aut prosegue by Hugo Grotius, and under which any State has an obligation to search for and prosecute international criminals for these heinous acts, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators and their victims, as well as the place where the crime was committed, or to extradite international criminals to any State that requires their extradition for prosecution and punishment, or to an international criminal tribunal. Thus, a state is obliged to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over international crimes and international criminals, or to extradite them to another state or to an international criminal court under conditions determined by international law and national law. Key words: universal jurisdiction, International criminal court, international crime, state sovereignty.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-311
Author(s):  
Eki Yemisi Omorogbe

Abstract This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law.


Author(s):  
Светлана Глотова ◽  
Svetlana Glotova

The origin of the concept “Crimes against Humanity” (СaH) — one of most serious crimes of international concern — can be found in 1915 Allied Joint Declaration and Martens Clause. CaH were first defined in Art. 6(c) of the Nuremberg IMT Statute. CaH are included in the jurisdiction of International criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia, Rwanda Tribunal, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia, Special Panels for serious crimes in East Timor. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Art. 7) contains a broad definition of this crime that reflects the international customary law. Evolution of the CaH concept includes both the expansion of specific acts, forming this category, and its essential elements: attacks against civilian population; link with armed conflicts; large scale and regularity of attacks; and, probably, inclusion into the illegitimate policy conducted by states and other actors. In the absence of a uniform definition of CaH in the statutes of courts and the convention, the work of International Law Commission makes a considerable contribution to the modern development and understanding of the concept. The adoption by ILC of the CaH definition, based on the ICC Statute will confirm the generally recognized definition of the CaH concept; and a wide range of states’ obligations on suppression, prevention and cooperation proves, inter alia, the erga omnes nature of the CaH prohibition.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 177-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Djamchid Momtaz

International humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts has long been characterized by the absence of universal competence to suppress serious violations of its provisions. This failure has been due to the reluctance of states – which are naturally prone to consider any limitation of their exclusive competence in this field as a threat to their sovereignty – to criminalize such acts under international law.The first attempt at remedying such a situation was seen in the Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court (ICC), which was prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1994, and inspired by the draft articles of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and International Security of Mankind, provisionally adopted by the ILC in 1991 at first reading. Under the Draft Statute of the ICC, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts would be under the jurisdiction of the Court. The ILC had in mind exceptionally serious war crimes, such as those described in the pertinent article of the draft code referred to by the Commission, constituting an extremely grave violation of the principles and laws of international law applicable in armed conflicts. In the commentary on this article, the ILC took care to specify that the expression ‘armed conflict’ covered the non-international armed conflicts that are the focus of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as international armed conflicts.This first step was of very limited scope. In fact, according to the ILC, in order to be criminalized, the laws and customs of war had to find their origin in general customary international law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-847
Author(s):  
Federica D’Alessandra ◽  
Matthew Gillett

Abstract The starvation of civilians is an all too frequent feature of armed conflict. While starvation may occur as an unintended consequence of military activities, it is also sometimes intentionally used by conflicting parties as a method of warfare. There is a broad consensus that the employment of starvation tactics during armed conflict is morally repugnant. This condemnation is reflected in many instruments of international law, which prohibit the use of starvation as a method of warfare in all armed conflicts. Despite this apparent consensus, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court only includes the starvation of civilians as a war crime when it is committed during an international armed conflict. In the face of this anomaly, Switzerland has proposed an amendment to the Rome Statute, whereby the crime of starving civilians would also apply to non-international armed conflicts. The following analysis addresses the key issues arising from the Swiss proposal, including the legal basis for the prohibition under customary and conventional international law, the elements of the proposed formulation, and the policy implications of adopting such an amendment to the Rome Statute.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 260-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parvathi Menon

Weak sub-Saharan African states use international law and its institutions to legitimate their actions and delegitimate their internal enemies. In this essay, I argue that during internal armed conflicts, African states use international criminal law to redefine the conflict as international and thereby rebrand domestic political opponents as international criminals/enemies who are a threat to the entire community. This in turn sets the stage for invoking belligerent privileges under international humanitarian law (IHL).


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


Author(s):  
Andrew Wolman

Abstract The International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states parties. However, it has never been clear whether the Court will automatically recognize a nationality that has been conferred by a state party under its domestic law, nor what criteria it would use to evaluate that nationality should it not be automatically accepted. In December 2019, the Office of the Prosecutor made its first formal pronouncement on the question, finding that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over North Koreans, despite their being South Korean nationals under South Korean law, because North Koreans are not able to exercise their rights as South Koreans until accepted as such by application, and on occasion their applications might be refused. In this article, I reject the Prosecutor’s analysis as misguided. I also reject the other main approaches to nationality recognition suggested by scholars, namely a ‘genuine link’ requirement, a deferral to municipal law, and a deferral to municipal law except where a conferral of nationality violates international law. Instead, I propose a functional approach that would respect municipal conferral of nationality unless that conferral unreasonably interferes with the sovereign interests of a non-state party.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 672-690
Author(s):  
Kyle Rapp

AbstractWhat is the role of rhetoric and argumentation in international relations? Some argue that it is little more than ‘cheap talk’, while others say that it may play a role in persuasion or coordination. However, why states deploy certain arguments, and why these arguments succeed or fail, is less well understood. I argue that, in international negotiations, certain types of legal frames are particularly useful for creating winning arguments. When a state bases its arguments on constitutive legal claims, opponents are more likely to become trapped by the law: unable to develop sustainable rebuttals or advance their preferred policy. To evaluate this theory, I apply qualitative discourse analysis to the US arguments on the crime of aggression at the Kampala Review Conference of the International Criminal Court – where the US advanced numerous arguments intended to reshape the crime to align with US interests. The analysis supports the theoretical propositions – arguments framed on codified legal grounds had greater success, while arguments framed on more political grounds were less sustainable, failing to achieve the desired outcomes. These findings further develop our understanding of the use of international law in rhetoric, argumentation, and negotiation.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document