scholarly journals Compromise in cooperative game and the VIKOR method

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serafim Opricovic
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Multicriteria Decision Making ◽  
Vikor Method ◽  
Compromise Value ◽  
Transferable Utility Game ◽  
Conflicting Objectives ◽  
Decision Making Problem

Five approaches in conflict resolution are distinguished, based on cooperativeness and aggressiveness in resolving conflict. Compromise based on cooperativeness is emphasized here as a solution in conflict resolution. Cooperative game theory oriented towards aiding the conflict resolution is considered and the compromise value for TU(transferable utility)-game is presented. The method VIKOR could be applied to determine compromise solution of a multicriteria decision making problem with noncommensurable and conflicting criteria. Compromise is considered as an intermediate state between conflicting objectives or criteria reached by mutual concession. The applicability of the cooperative game theory and the VIKOR method for conflict resolution is illustrated.

On Inheritance of Complementarity in Non-Additive Measures Under Bounded Interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
Katsushige Fujimoto ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Multicriteria Decision Making ◽  
Multicriteria Decision ◽  
Restricted Domains ◽  
Additive Measures ◽  
Exponential Complexity

The notions ofk-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models,k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).

An Interval-Based Focalization Method for Decision-Making in Decentralized, Multi-Functional Design

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jitesh H. Panchal ◽  
Marco Gero Ferna´ndez ◽  
Janet K. Allen ◽  
Christiaan J. J. Paredis ◽  
Farrokh Mistree
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Design Space ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Functional Design ◽  
Space Partitioning ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Design Variables ◽  
Conflicting Objectives

Multi-functional design problems are characterized by strong coupling between design variables that are controlled by stakeholders from different disciplines. This coupling necessitates efficient modeling of interactions between multiple designers who want to achieve conflicting objectives but share control over design variables. Various game-theoretic protocols such as cooperative, non-cooperative, and leader/follower have been used to model interactions between designers. Non-cooperative game theory protocols are of particular interest for modeling cooperation in multi-functional design problems. These are the focus of this paper because they more closely reflect the level of information exchange possible in a distributed environment. Two strategies for solving such non-cooperative game theory problems are: a) passing Rational Reaction Sets (RRS) among designers and combining these to find points of intersection and b) exchanging single points in the design space iteratively until the solution converges to a single point. While the first strategy is computationally expensive because it requires each designer to consider all possible outcomes of decisions made by other designers, the second strategy may result in divergence of the solution. In order to overcome these problems, we present an interval-based focalization method for executing decentralized decision-making problems that are common in multi-functional design scenarios. The method involves propagating ranges of design variables and systematically eliminating infeasible portions of the shared design space. This stands in marked contrast to the successive consideration of single points, as emphasized in current multifunctional design methods. The key advantages of the proposed method are: a) targeted reduction of design freedom and b) non-divergence of solutions. The method is illustrated using two sample scenarios — solution of a decision problem with quadratic objectives and the design of multi-functional Linear Cellular Alloys (LCAs). Implications include use of the method to guide design space partitioning and control assignment.

Grid Cyber-Physical System Risk Management Model Based on Cooperative Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Physical System ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Power Grid ◽  
Management Model ◽  
Cyber Physical System ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Generation Power

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.

Review of Cooperative Game Theory applications in power system expansion planning

2021 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 111056
Author(s):  
Andrey Churkin ◽  
Janusz Bialek ◽  
David Pozo ◽  
Enzo Sauma ◽  
Nikolay Korgin
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Power System ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
System Expansion ◽  
Expansion Planning

Query Games in Databases

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Computational Aspects ◽  
Aggregate Query ◽  
Boolean Query

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.

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