An Interval-Based Focalization Method for Decision-Making in Decentralized, Multi-Functional Design

Author(s):  
Jitesh H. Panchal ◽  
Marco Gero Ferna´ndez ◽  
Janet K. Allen ◽  
Christiaan J. J. Paredis ◽  
Farrokh Mistree

Multi-functional design problems are characterized by strong coupling between design variables that are controlled by stakeholders from different disciplines. This coupling necessitates efficient modeling of interactions between multiple designers who want to achieve conflicting objectives but share control over design variables. Various game-theoretic protocols such as cooperative, non-cooperative, and leader/follower have been used to model interactions between designers. Non-cooperative game theory protocols are of particular interest for modeling cooperation in multi-functional design problems. These are the focus of this paper because they more closely reflect the level of information exchange possible in a distributed environment. Two strategies for solving such non-cooperative game theory problems are: a) passing Rational Reaction Sets (RRS) among designers and combining these to find points of intersection and b) exchanging single points in the design space iteratively until the solution converges to a single point. While the first strategy is computationally expensive because it requires each designer to consider all possible outcomes of decisions made by other designers, the second strategy may result in divergence of the solution. In order to overcome these problems, we present an interval-based focalization method for executing decentralized decision-making problems that are common in multi-functional design scenarios. The method involves propagating ranges of design variables and systematically eliminating infeasible portions of the shared design space. This stands in marked contrast to the successive consideration of single points, as emphasized in current multifunctional design methods. The key advantages of the proposed method are: a) targeted reduction of design freedom and b) non-divergence of solutions. The method is illustrated using two sample scenarios — solution of a decision problem with quadratic objectives and the design of multi-functional Linear Cellular Alloys (LCAs). Implications include use of the method to guide design space partitioning and control assignment.

Author(s):  
Katsushige Fujimoto ◽  

The notions ofk-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models,k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 257-272
Author(s):  
Leszek Zaremba ◽  
Cezary S. Zaremba ◽  
Marek Suchenek

Abstract The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.


2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 1525-1532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Meng ◽  
Neng Gang Xie ◽  
Xiao Jing Han

Considering helical gear transmission's economic performance and drive reliability, construct multi-objective optimization model of the helical gear transmission with taking normal module, teeth number of small helical gear, helix angle and the gear width coefficient as design variables and taking the volume of small and large helical gear and opposite number of overlap ratio as objective functions. Propose multi-objective optimization design method based on coalition cooperative game theory where the two design goals are seen as two game players. By calculating the impact factor of design variables to objective functions and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into strategy space of game players. Each game player takes its own revenue function as target and does single objective optimization in its own strategy space in order to get its own best strategy. The best strategies of all players form a combination of one round game and the optimal solution can be obtained through several game rounds. Example results show the effectiveness of game method.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serafim Opricovic

Five approaches in conflict resolution are distinguished, based on cooperativeness and aggressiveness in resolving conflict. Compromise based on cooperativeness is emphasized here as a solution in conflict resolution. Cooperative game theory oriented towards aiding the conflict resolution is considered and the compromise value for TU(transferable utility)-game is presented. The method VIKOR could be applied to determine compromise solution of a multicriteria decision making problem with noncommensurable and conflicting criteria. Compromise is considered as an intermediate state between conflicting objectives or criteria reached by mutual concession. The applicability of the cooperative game theory and the VIKOR method for conflict resolution is illustrated.


Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.


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