Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities

We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.

Compromise in cooperative game and the VIKOR method

Five approaches in conflict resolution are distinguished, based on cooperativeness and aggressiveness in resolving conflict. Compromise based on cooperativeness is emphasized here as a solution in conflict resolution. Cooperative game theory oriented towards aiding the conflict resolution is considered and the compromise value for TU(transferable utility)-game is presented. The method VIKOR could be applied to determine compromise solution of a multicriteria decision making problem with noncommensurable and conflicting criteria. Compromise is considered as an intermediate state between conflicting objectives or criteria reached by mutual concession. The applicability of the cooperative game theory and the VIKOR method for conflict resolution is illustrated.

GEOMETRY AND COMPUTATION OF THE LORENZ SET

In this paper we study the geometrical properties of the set of Lorenz allocations of a transferable utility game. We provide procedures to compute a single Lorenz allocation, and even the entire set of Lorenz allocations, that rely solely on linear optimization techniques. These procedures only require a finite number of elementary operations and are therefore easy to implement.