Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts and the Exhaustion of Available Remedies

1950 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 856
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
pp. 88-97
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

The notion of an independent judiciary that restrained the other branches was an infant with a questionable life expectancy when John Marshall stated in placatory dicta in Ex Parte Bollman (1807)—quite wrongly as a matter of both British history and American constitutional law— that the federal courts had no inherent authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in the absence of legislation. The Suspension Clause, he claimed, was merely precatory, an injunction to Congress to pass such legislation. The highly political case involved Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, alleged members of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, and pitted prominent federalists such as petitioners’ counsel Robert Goodloe Harper and Charles Lee against the administration of Thomas Jefferson. After reviewing the factual and political background, this chapter details the arguments of counsel in favor of inherent judicial authority to grant the writ and Marshall’s rejection of them. Judicial autonomy was under threat at the time and Marshall was trying to defend it But his words were a judicial sea mine that created a long-term danger: Congress could by simple inaction evade the bedrock prohibition against suspension of the writ.







2021 ◽  
pp. 107-138
Author(s):  
James E. Pfander

This chapter describes the conflicts that arose as the new case-or-controversy requirement came to be seen as in conflict with the broad range of uncontested proceedings that had formed a traditional part of nineteenth-century federal practice. Courts, scholars, and litigants have questioned the power of federal courts to hear bankruptcy proceedings, petitions for naturalized citizenship, applications to approve testimonial immunity, warrant proceedings, petitions for habeas corpus relief, and a range of other matters. So far, at least, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to deploy its case-or-controversy rule to upset established forms of proceeding.



Author(s):  
James E. Pfander

Cases Without Controversies: Uncontested Adjudication in Article III Courts offers a new account of the power of federal courts in the United States to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right. Familiar to lawyers in civil law countries as forms of voluntary or non-contentious jurisdiction, these uncontested applications fit uneasily with the commitment to adversary legalism in the United States. Indeed, modern accounts of federal judicial power often urge that the language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of concrete disputes between adverse parties and rules out all forms of non-contentious jurisdiction. Said to rest on the so-called “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III, this requirement of party contestation threatens the power of federal courts to conduct a range of familiar proceedings, such as the oversight of bankruptcy proceedings, the issuance of warrants, and the adjudication of applications for mandamus and habeas corpus relief. By recounting the tradition of naturalization and other uncontested litigation in antebellum America and coupling that tradition with an account of the important difference between cases and controversies, this book challenges the prevailing understanding of Article III. In addition to defending the power of federal courts to hear uncontested matters of federal law, this book examines the way the Constitution’s meaning has changed over time and suggests an interpretive methodology that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to take account of the old and the new in defining the contours of federal judicial power.







1927 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 433
Author(s):  
Armistead M. Dobie
Keyword(s):  


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