Cases Without Controversies

Cases Without Controversies: Uncontested Adjudication in Article III Courts offers a new account of the power of federal courts in the United States to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right. Familiar to lawyers in civil law countries as forms of voluntary or non-contentious jurisdiction, these uncontested applications fit uneasily with the commitment to adversary legalism in the United States. Indeed, modern accounts of federal judicial power often urge that the language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of concrete disputes between adverse parties and rules out all forms of non-contentious jurisdiction. Said to rest on the so-called “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III, this requirement of party contestation threatens the power of federal courts to conduct a range of familiar proceedings, such as the oversight of bankruptcy proceedings, the issuance of warrants, and the adjudication of applications for mandamus and habeas corpus relief. By recounting the tradition of naturalization and other uncontested litigation in antebellum America and coupling that tradition with an account of the important difference between cases and controversies, this book challenges the prevailing understanding of Article III. In addition to defending the power of federal courts to hear uncontested matters of federal law, this book examines the way the Constitution’s meaning has changed over time and suggests an interpretive methodology that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to take account of the old and the new in defining the contours of federal judicial power.

Introduction

This book’s introduction poses the problem of uncontested adjudication in the federal court system of the United States by focusing on the 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor. While in that case, the Supreme Court reached the merits despite the absence of a continuing dispute between the parties, Justice Antonin Scalia objected that doing so violated the adverse-party requirement, which he viewed as a constitutional requirement imposed by the case-or-controversy language of Article III. In arguing that federal courts may not entertain uncontested claims of right, Scalia’s dissent in Windsor nicely poses the question at the heart of this book. But the book reaches a different conclusion, based on the text and history of the Constitution, and the early practice of Article III courts. Having set the stage, the introduction offers an overview of the book’s argument. Part I describes the early practice of the antebellum federal courts, Part II the rise of the case-or-controversy rule in the early twentieth century, and Part III the continuing relevance of uncontested forms of adjudication. Synthesizing these strands, the book concludes that Article III courts can entertain proceedings to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right under federal law.

How Much Democracy is too Much Democracy?

Despite their widespread use, many rightfully question the prudence of using popular elections to fill state courts. A key difference between federal and state courts is that while federal judges are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the majority of jurists at the state level are elected. The reason federal judges, at least judges on the Article III courts, are made by executive selection is the same reason that Supreme Court justices are given life tenure: to insulate them from the whims of public opinion. In this passage, Hamilton articulates the fundamental paradox of democracy, a question that genuine republics have always grappled with: how can we control for the “tyranny of the majority?” In other words, how can we entrust people with the power to govern themselves but also prevent them from stripping away the rights of minority groups or from posing a danger to others?