scholarly journals The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States

1906 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 316
Author(s):  
J. R. F. ◽  
Frank J. Goodnow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Administrative Law

scholarly journals The Insurance Commissioner in the United States, a Study in Administrative Law and Practice

1927 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 440
Author(s):  
D. O. McGovney ◽  
Edwin Wilhite Patterson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Administrative Law

scholarly journals Law–Space Nexus, Global Governance, and Global Administrative Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 327-345
Author(s):  
Ming-Sung Kuo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The United States ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Project Approach ◽  
The World ◽  
Global Constitutionalism ◽  
History Of ◽  
Argument Proceeds

This chapter sheds light on the multinational research project approach to global governance, which is known as global administrative law (GAL), with a focus on the unease GAL has expressed with its own constitutional implications. The argument proceeds as follows. First, it is explained why GAL’s approach to global governance echoes the history of responding to the emergence of modern administrative agencies with administrative law in the United States. It is also noted that GAL reframes the world of national legal orders as a ‘global administrative space’. Second, it is shown that GAL turns to the idea of ‘publicness’ to address the dual challenge of legality and legitimacy and the question of legal pluralism arising from the heterogeneity of global governance. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the unsettled relationship between GAL and global constitutionalism.

scholarly journals NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL: ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES IN THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 243
Author(s):  
Russell L. Weaver ◽  
Linda D. Jellum
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Administrative State ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The Status ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Administrative Adjudication ◽  
Divided Powers

This article examines the role of administrative adjudication in the United States constitutional system. It begins by noting that such adjudication fits uncomfortably within a system of divided powers. Administrative judges, including administrative law judges [ALJs] (who have the highest level of protection and status), are considerably more circumscribed than ordinary Article III judges. Indeed, administrative judges are usually housed in the agencies for which they decide cases, rather than in independent adjudicative bodies, and they do not always have the final say regarding the cases they decide. In many instances, the agency can appeal an adverse administrative judge’s decision directly to the head of the agency, and the agency head retains broad power to overrule the administrative judge’s determinations. In other words, the agency can substitute its judgment for that of the administrative judge regarding factual determinations, legal determinations, and policy choices. As a result, many administrative adjudicative structures involve difficult tradeoffs between independence, political control, and accountability. This article examines issues related to the status and power of administrative judges, as well as the constraints that have been imposed on administrative adjudicative authority, and explores whether those constraints continue to serve the purposes for which they were originally imposed.Cet article examine le rôle du règlement de différends dans le domaine administratif dans le cadre du système constitutionnel des États-Unis. Il note d’abord qu’une telle façon de régler les différends cadre difficilement avec un système où les pouvoirs sont divisés. Les juges administratifs, y inclus les juges de droit administratif (qui jouissent du niveau le plus élevé de protection et de statut), sont considérablement plus restreints que les juges ordinaires sous l’Article III. En effet, les juges administratifs sont d’habitude logés dans les agences pour lesquelles ils décident les cas, plutôt qu’au sein d’organismes indépendants de règlement de différends, et ils n’ont pas toujours le dernier mot dans les cas qu’ils jugent. Dans bien des cas, l’agence peut porter en appel directement au chef de l’agence une décision défavorable d’un juge administratif, et le chef de l’agence possède de vastes pouvoirs pour annuler la décision du juge administratif. En d’autres mots, l’agence peut substituer son jugement à celui du juge administratif quant aux décisions de fait, aux décisions de droit et aux choix de politiques. Par conséquent, plusieurs structures de règlement de différends dans le domaine administratif comportent des compromis difficiles entre l’indépendance, le contrôle politique et l’obligation de rendre compte. Cet article examine des questions se rapportant au statut et au pouvoir de juges administratifs, ainsi qu’aux contraintes qui ont été imposées sur l’autorité de régler des différends dans le domaine administratif, et explore la question à savoir si ces contraintes continuent à servir les buts pour lesquels elles ont été imposées originellement.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document