scholarly journals The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America

1900 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
John H. Latane
1970 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 697
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Kaplan ◽  
Henry Blumenthal

2019 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 722-727

Diplomatic relations — Diplomatic agents — Immunity from jurisdiction — Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 — Article 31(1)(c) — Action by domestic servant alleging that she had been trafficked and forced to work by former employers — Certification of diplomatic status of former employers — Whether diplomatic immunity continuing despite subsequent termination of diplomatic status — Whether commercial activity exception applicable to hiring of domestic servant — Whether subsequent attempts at service defective — Whether Court lacking jurisdiction — The law of the United States


1972 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-440
Author(s):  
Randolph Campbell

It is well known that the initial task of interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as a functional policy in international relations fell largely on John Quincy Adams. Somewhat ironically, the noncolonization principle in Monroe's famed Annual Message of 1823 for which Adams, then Secretary of State, was most responsible, received relatively little attention in the 1820's. Leaders in the United States and Spanish America alike were more concerned with the meaning of the other main principle involved in the Message—nonintervention. What were the practical implications of Monroe's warning that the United States would consider intervention by a European power in the affairs of any independent American nation “ as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States ” ? John Quincy Adams laid the groundwork for an answer to this question in July, 1824, when Colombia, alarmed by rumors of French interference in the wars for independence, sought a treaty of alliance. The President and Congress, Adams replied, would take the necessary action to support nonintervention if a crisis arose, but there would be no alliance. In fact, he added, it would be necessary for the United States to have an understanding with certain European powers whose principles and interests also supported nonintervention before any action could be taken or any alliance completed to uphold it. The position taken by the Secretary of State cooled enthusiasm for the Monroe Doctrine, but Spanish American leaders did not accept this rebuff in 1824 as final.


2008 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caitlin A. Fitz

A new order for the New World was unfolding in the early nineteenth century, or so many in the United States believed. Between 1808 and 1825, all of Portuguese America and nearly all of Spanish America broke away from Europe, casting off Old World monarchs and inaugurating home-grown governments instead. People throughout the United States looked on with excitement, as the new order seemed at once to vindicate their own revolution as well as offer new possibilities for future progress. Free from obsolete European alliances, they hoped, the entire hemisphere could now rally together around republican government and commercial reciprocity. Statesmen and politicians were no exception, as men from Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe to John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay tried to exclude European influence from the hemisphere while securing new markets for American manufactures and agricultural surplus.


1972 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 524
Author(s):  
Rene Albrecht-Carrie ◽  
Henry Blumenthal ◽  
John Newhouse ◽  
Guy de Carmoy ◽  
Elaine P. Halperin

1971 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 287
Author(s):  
Hilary Conroy ◽  
Yur-Bok Lee

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