The Instructed Vision: Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Origins of American Fiction

1962 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 289
Author(s):  
Charles R. Crowe ◽  
Terence Martin
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
American Fiction ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy

The “New Empire of Common Sense”

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul B. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Atlantic World ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Joseph Priestley ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy

Although the rise of Scottish common sense philosophy was one of the most important intellectual developments of the Enlightenment, significant gaps remain in our understanding of the reception of Scottish common sense philosophy in the Atlantic world during the second half of the eighteenth century. This chapter focuses on the British context in the period 1764–93, and examines published responses to James Oswald, James Beattie, and, especially, Thomas Reid. The chapter contextualizes the polemics of Joseph Priestley against the three Scots and argues that it was Joseph Berington rather than Priestley who was the first critic to claim that the appeal to common sense was the defining feature of “the Scotch school” of philosophy. It also shows that Reid was widely acknowledged to be the founder and most accomplished exponent of the “school”, whereas Beattie and Oswald were typically dismissed as being derivative thinkers.

A Change for the Better

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-246
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
Epistemological Framework ◽  
Internalist Reliabilism

This chapter makes the case that Hume’s epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is superior to that of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, the framework of EHU 12 has strong parallels to contemporary epistemology, in contrast to the Title Principle from THN 1.4.7.11. In particular, aspects of this framework have affinities with Wright-style conservatism, and Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Second, this framework avoids the weaknesses that afflicted the Title Principle: it has adequate foundation, is able to satisfactorily reject superstition, and is founded on truth. Third, unlike its analogue in the Treatise, the epistemological framework of the Enquiry is able to offer a ‘compleat answer’ to Reid and Beattie by denying the common-sense philosophy that is the fundamental basis of their critiques of his philosophy.

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