Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the
other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative
answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d)
questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic
normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more
inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to
questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a
priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic
maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we
should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity,
at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For
Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition
for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume,
precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the
matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic
involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between
Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their
views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will
focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the
end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume
and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper
will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the
expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic
normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to
the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.