A Change for the Better

This chapter makes the case that Hume’s epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is superior to that of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, the framework of EHU 12 has strong parallels to contemporary epistemology, in contrast to the Title Principle from THN 1.4.7.11. In particular, aspects of this framework have affinities with Wright-style conservatism, and Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Second, this framework avoids the weaknesses that afflicted the Title Principle: it has adequate foundation, is able to satisfactorily reject superstition, and is founded on truth. Third, unlike its analogue in the Treatise, the epistemological framework of the Enquiry is able to offer a ‘compleat answer’ to Reid and Beattie by denying the common-sense philosophy that is the fundamental basis of their critiques of his philosophy.

The Title Principle and THN 1.4.7

This chapter studies Hume’s considered treatment of scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature in THN1.4.7. It finds the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11) to be pivotal in resolving the dangerous dilemma (THN 1.4.7.6). In response to the question of when ought we to assent to reason, Hume’s answer is that we should do so when it is lively and mixes with some propensity. The chapter explores a number of interpretive alternatives and offers some preliminary reasons for resisting them. It ends by addressing a few objections to interpretations that are founded on the Title Principle, arguing that we have dialectical reason to read the Title Principle as crucial to Hume’s resolution to scepticism in THN 1.4.7, despite the position being philosophically problematic.

Critical Self-Reflection

This chapter argues that the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding expresses Hume’s own dissatisfaction with the treatment of scepticism found in the Treatise of Human Nature. EHU 1.12 argues that curiosity, so crucial in THN 1.4.7, can in fact lead one to false metaphysics. EHU 5.1 is striking insofar as it states that Hume’s preferred Academical philosophy does not mingle with the passions. This is antithetical to the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11), which recommends assenting to reason when it mixes with the passions. Thus, the Enquiry seems to distinctly reject the anti-sceptical framework of the Treatise, paving the way for a new epistemology in the later work.

The Scepticism of Book 1, Part 4

This chapter explores the secondary literature on the relationship between Hume’s treatments of scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and briefly outlines the position that while Hume’s starting and finishing epistemological positions are similar between the two, his justifications for reaching such a finishing point differs considerably between the two. It then proceeds to offer a brief overview of THN 1.4.1 (Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason), THN 1.4.2 (Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses), THN 1.4.3 (Of the Antient Philosophy), and THN 1.4.4 (Of the Modern Philosophy), which are relevant to Hume’s considered treatment of scepticism in THN 1.4.7 (Conclusion of this book).

Hume’s Negative Argument on Induction

This chapter compares Hume’s negative arguments on induction in Section 1.3.6 of the Treatise of Human Nature and Section 4 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. It finds that the argument in the Enquiry is intended to establish a primarily sceptical result, while the argument in the Treatise is intended to establish a primarily psychological result. For one, the surrounding context in the Treatise suggests a more descriptive nature to the argument of THN 1.3.6, while the surrounding context in the Enquiry suggests a more normative nature to the argument of EHU 4. Moreover, the structure of the arguments themselves in these two sections offer further evidence for this difference.

The Relation between the Treatise and the Enquiry

This chapter outlines two critical interpretive issues: the relationship between Hume’s scepticism and his naturalism; and the relationship between the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. In particular, it makes a preliminary case that these two interpretive issues are intimately connected: Hume changes his epistemology between the Treatise and the Enquiry due to a dissatisfaction with his treatment of scepticism in the former work. The chapter offers a preliminary investigation of Hume’s characterisation of the relationship between the Treatise and the Enquiry. It outlines a case for Hume’s motivation in writing the Advertisement and the Enquiry being a concern for his intellectual legacy. In particular, it is suggested that the Enquiry and the Advertisement are meant to rectify Hume’s treatment of scepticism in the Treatise.

Hume’s Aims

This chapter compares Hume’s characterisation of his aims and methodologies in the Introduction to the Treatise of Human Nature and Section 1 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. It finds that key among the differences between the two is that EHU 1 stresses the taxonomic project of ‘mental geography’ (EHU 1.13), and also a negative project of rejecting false metaphysics, both of which are absent from the Introduction to the Treatise. This ‘mental geography’ will prove crucial to the negative project of rejecting false metaphysics, and foreshadows Hume’s more comprehensive presentation of his epistemology in EHU 12. The chapter argues that these differences suggest that the Enquiry is a more normatively focused work than the Treatise.

Hume’s Positive Argument on Induction

This chapter compares Hume’s positive arguments on induction in Section 1.3.6–8 of the Treatise of Human Nature and Section 5 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. It finds that EHU 5, unlike the corresponding discussion in the Treatise, begins by seeking to reassure the reader that the positive argument will assuage the spectre of scepticism. The positive argument seems able to perform this role in virtue of its emphasising the truth-conducive nature of custom at the close of EHU 5. This reliability of custom offers an epistemological justification for our inductive practices, despite their not being founded on reason.

A New Epistemology

This chapter explores Hume’s considered treatment of scepticism in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding in EHU 12. It finds a two-tiered epistemology in this section. First, Hume’s dismissal of antecedent scepticism suggests that he accords our faculties default authority (EHU 12.3). Having done so, we use these faculties to reflexively investigate themselves; those that are found wanting will be dismissed in line with Hume’s consequent scepticism (EHU 12.5). Pyrrhonian scepticism is founded on a problematic methodology: it either over-generalises discovered unreliability in our faculties, or ventures into enquiries for which our faculties are entirely unsuited. Thus, Hume rejects it in favour of his own mitigated scepticism, which recommends staying within the limits of our faculties. The chapter then argues against the sceptical interpretation of EHU 12, before pointing to various parallels between this account and EHU 1, EHU 5, and Part 1 of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

A Flawed Framework

This chapter argues that the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11) that is pivotal to Hume’s response to scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature is deeply flawed in a number of respects. First, Hume lacks any grounds for endorsing it; second, it is unable to dismiss superstition, forcing Hume to appeal to unsatisfactory grounds of dangerousness in order to reject such religious enquiries; finally, in founding epistemic justification on the passions, which are not sensitive to truth, Hume’s resulting epistemology seems somewhat divorced from truth. Thus, it is little surprise that Hume would have looked to offer a new epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that could rectify these problems.