A Change for the Better

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-246
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
Epistemological Framework ◽  
Internalist Reliabilism

This chapter makes the case that Hume’s epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is superior to that of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, the framework of EHU 12 has strong parallels to contemporary epistemology, in contrast to the Title Principle from THN 1.4.7.11. In particular, aspects of this framework have affinities with Wright-style conservatism, and Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Second, this framework avoids the weaknesses that afflicted the Title Principle: it has adequate foundation, is able to satisfactorily reject superstition, and is founded on truth. Third, unlike its analogue in the Treatise, the epistemological framework of the Enquiry is able to offer a ‘compleat answer’ to Reid and Beattie by denying the common-sense philosophy that is the fundamental basis of their critiques of his philosophy.

A Flawed Framework

2020 ◽  
pp. 147-166
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Epistemological Framework

This chapter argues that the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11) that is pivotal to Hume’s response to scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature is deeply flawed in a number of respects. First, Hume lacks any grounds for endorsing it; second, it is unable to dismiss superstition, forcing Hume to appeal to unsatisfactory grounds of dangerousness in order to reject such religious enquiries; finally, in founding epistemic justification on the passions, which are not sensitive to truth, Hume’s resulting epistemology seems somewhat divorced from truth. Thus, it is little surprise that Hume would have looked to offer a new epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that could rectify these problems.

Deciphering Hume

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Evgeniy N. Blinov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Gradual Shift ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Philosophical Project

The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.

Metaphysics, Moral Sense, and the Pragmatism of the Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna L. Blumenthal
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
American Constitution ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy

The authors of these insightful and stimulating commentaries all express skepticism about the role I assign to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy in my historical analysis, though their reasons for doing so are strikingly at odds with each other. Sarah Seo and John Witt concede the importance of the Common Sense philosophy at a theoretical level, even as they call attention to certain “competitor theories” of human nature, noting that these darker views of the self may have proved more influential in the framing of the American constitution. However, they go on to contend that all of this philosophizing about the human mind was actually of little consequence in the everyday adjudication of civil and criminal liability, as judges found more practical means of resolving “the otherwise intractable questions of moral responsibility” left unanswered by the Scottish philosophy. John Mikhail, by contrast, appears to be far more sanguine about the tractability of these questions, from a philosophical standpoint, going so far as to suggest that they were more or less resolved by British moralists before the Scottish Common Sense school even came into being. What truly set the Common Sense philosophers apart from their predecessors, and ought to determine their place in this history of ideas, Mikhail concludes, was the manner in which they contributed to the scientific process of tracing out the inner structure and innate capacities of “the moral mind”—a topic that is currently of intense interest in the cognitive and brain sciences.

scholarly journals Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-161
Author(s):  
Jani Hakkarainen
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Realist Interpretation ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Decisive Objection ◽  
Sceptical Argument

In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.

scholarly journals A imaginação como fundamento das ciências experimentais

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Main Aspect ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Mind

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.

The Common Sense of a Poet

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. W. Mills
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Central Target ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
Intellectual Milieu ◽  
The Common ◽  
Literary Arts

This chapter examines the writing and content of James Beattie’s (1735–1803) best-selling Essay on Truth (1770) in terms of his motivations and interests in the late 1760s. The Essay was intended to be a mocking attack on recent sceptical philosophy, with Hume as the central target. The chapter argues that Beattie’s arguments emerged out of the intellectual milieu of 1760s Aberdeen, but were influenced greatly by his interest in the literary arts. The latter framed his particular understanding of the ‘science of human nature’ as something best studied by poets, novelists, and historians and not introspective philosophers. Moreover, Beattie is argued not to be a fearful provincial author railing against the commercial life of Edinburgh and London, but a man deeply angered by recent philosophy from Descartes to Hume and who had many supporters in and outside of Aberdeen pressing him to publish his pugilistic Essay.

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