State Constitutional Law in 1933–34

1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-627
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Stress And Strain ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Bar Association ◽  
Lord Chancellor ◽  
State Constitutional Law

More than ten years ago, the Earl of Birkenhead, former Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, speaking before the American Bar Association, expressed the belief that it was a question for the future to determine whether the barriers which the framers of the constitutions placed upon the complete freedom of legislative assemblies in the United States will prove equal to the emergencies as they arise and will be as adaptable to the stress and strain of political exigencies as the more flexible and more democratic arrangements of the British constitution. “Your constitution,” he remarked, “is expressed and defined in documents which can be pronounced upon by the Supreme Court. In this sense, your judges are the masters of your executive. Your constitution is a cast-iron document. It falls to be construed by the Supreme Court with the same sense of easy and admitted mastery as any ordinary contract. This circumstance provides a breakwater of enormous value against ill-considered and revolutionary changes.” On the other hand, so far as England is concerned, the genius of the Anglo-Saxon people has, rightly or wrongly, refused to shackle in the slightest degree the constitutional competence of later generations. Any law of Great Britain can be altered by Parliament and no court may challenge the constitutional force of an act of Parliament. It is on the whole premature, thought Lord Birkenhead, to decide whether you or we have been right.

Constitutional Law in 1949–1950

1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-109
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
The United States ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court

There were two changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1949 term. Attorney General Tom C. Clark was sworn in as an Associate Justice to succeed the late Justice Frank Murphy on August 24, 1949, after his nomination by President Truman had been approved on August 19 by a vote of 73 to 8. Judge Sherman Minton of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was nominated to be an Associate Justice on September 15, 1949, to succeed Justice Wiley Rutledge. His nomination was approved by the Senate on October 4 by a vote of 48 to 16, and he was sworn in on October 12. During much of the term Justice Douglas was absent as the result of an accident incurred during the preceding summer recess. The loss of Justices Murphy and Rutledge greatly weakened the liberal alignment of the Court and very positively influenced the decision of a number of doubtful cases contrary to precedents of a recent date.

Libertarian Motivations on the Vinson Court

1953 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-336
Author(s):  
C. Herman Pritchett
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Devil

Justice Frankfurter is fond of quoting an old English saying that “the devil himself knoweth not the mind of men.” The mind of a man who happens to be a judge is the center of many contending impulses when he is making it up, and an external reconstruction of the process is quite impossible. However, the rules of the game require that judges supply clues to their thought processes in the form of written opinions. In every major case decided by the Supreme Court, one or more of its members provide a written justification for the decision announced. The individualistic tradition of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, moreover, permits justices who do not agree with the views of their brethren to say so, and to give their reasons for dissenting. Thus the Supreme Court on decision day takes on the aspect of a small legislature in which votes are cast pro and con on significant issues of public policy, with accompanying explanations much more coherent and systematic and better-reasoned than are customarily available in explanation of votes cast, say, in the United States Senate.While it has not been usual to do so, these judicial votes can be subjected to the same kinds of analysis as have been traditionally employed for the study of legislative voting behavior.

Constitutional Law in 1936–37: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1936

1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political History ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The 1936 term of the Supreme Court will probably be rated a notable one. This is due both to the Court's own work, and to certain extraneous occurrences which could hardly fail to have some impact upon it. In any attempt to evaluate the work of this term, one should bear in mind the following facts: First, a month after the Court convened President Roosevelt was reëlected by one of the most impressive popular and electoral majorities in our political history. Second, in February the President submitted to Congress his proposal for the reorganization of the Supreme Court, including the enlargement of its membership by the addition, up to fifteen, of a new justice for every one remaining on the Court beyond the age of seventy. This proposal aroused violent opposition, the debates on it continued for many months, and ultimately the plan was defeated largely through the efforts of the President's own party. The discussions on this proposal were going on during much of the time in which the Court was sitting. Third, in every case in which New Deal laws were attacked, they were held valid. These results were accomplished in many instances by five-to-four margins, and in the Minimum Wage Case by a five-to-four reversal of a previous five-to-three decision.

Constitutional Law in 1947–48: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1947

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308
Author(s):  
David Fellman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court during the 1947 term. The former Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, Avho had retired from the Court on July 1, 1941, died on August 27, 1948. Justice Hughes had served on the Court from May 2, 1910, to June 10, 1916, and was appointed Chief Justice on February 13,1930, succeeding William Howard Taft. In characteristic fashion, the justices filed during the 1947 term a very large number of dissenting and concurring opinions liberally salted with spirited and often bitter judicial invective.

Constitutional Law in 1937–1938: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1937

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-266
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Prior Service ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

During the 1937 term, the Supreme Court underwent the first changes in its personnel since Mr. Justice Cardozo succeeded Mr. Justice Holmes in March, 1932. On June 1, 1937, Mr. Justice Van Devanter retired and was succeeded at the opening of the new term in October by Mr. Justice Black. On January 18, 1938, Mr. Justice Sutherland retired and was succeeded on January 31 by Mr. Justice Reed. During a substantial part of the term, Mr. Justice Cardozo was absent on account of illness, and his death occurred July 9, 1938. Mr. Justice Black, whose appointment had attracted much public comment, threw himself into the work of the Court with unusual vigor. During the term, he wrote the opinion of the Court in fifteen cases. He dissented in fourteen cases, in nine of which he wrote dissenting opinions. He concurred without substantial opinion in eleven cases, and wrote a concurring opinion in one other case. Mr. Justice Reed participated less actively, first because of the lateness of his appointment, and second because his prior service as Solicitor-General of the United States disqualified him from sitting in a considerable number of cases. These changes in the membership of the Court have altered the almost even division on the bench between the so-called conservatives and the so-called liberals. Without attempting to speculate as to the course of future decisions, it is significant that the irreconcilably conservative block of justices, consisting of Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, McReynolds, and Butler, has been broken up.

State Constitutional Law in 1934–35

1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-630
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Taxes ◽  
State Constitutional Law

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.

Constitutional Law in 1944–45: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1944

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The membership of the Supreme Court did not change during the 1944 term, but Mr. Justice Roberts resigned in July after the term had ended. Divisions in the Court were as numerous and as difficult to classify as before. Four justices dissented in twenty-seven cases, while three justices dissented in sixteen cases. The Court seems to be moving toward the old practice of the pre-Marshall period by which the justices wrote seriatim opinions. There is a depressing increase in the number of cases in which three, four, and even five justices feel impelled to write separate opinions.

Constitutional Law in 1932–33: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1932

1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Program Material ◽  
North Shore ◽  
The North ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Great Equality ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Gary Indiana

The Supreme Court has at last passed squarely upon the broad powers of the Federal Radio Commission over the business of broadcasting and has upheld them in a sweeping manner in the case of Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. The general authority conferred on the Commission by the act of 1927 was enlarged in 1928 by provisions directing the Commission to maintain as great equality as possible in the allocating of broadcasting licenses among the zones created and further to distribute such licenses fairly and reasonably to the states within each zone according to population. In 1930, it appeared that Illinois had 55 per cent more than its quota of stations, while Indiana had 22 per cent under its quota. The Commission assigned to station WJKS at Gary, Indiana, operating rights on a frequency theretofore used by two Chicago stations. One of these, operated commercially by the respondent, used much National Broadcasting Company program material; the other, operated by the North Shore Church of Chicago, broadcast only religious programs. The effect of the order was to rule these stations off the air. It appeared that the Gary station had suffered from interference, and was furthermore equipped to serve its audiences with programs of unique interest.

The Case of the Appam

1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 809-831
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Newport News ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
High Seas

On July 29,1916, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered a decree to restore to the British claimants the steamer Appam, formerly an English merchant vessel, captured by the German cruiser Moewe upon the high seas and sent into Newport News to be laid up pending the war between Great Britain and Germany. In a very elaborate opinion, the court held that the Appam had no right under international law or the treaty with Prussia of May 1, 1828, to use an American port as an asylum; that it did not have a right under the circumstances to enter an American port at all; that by so doing it violated the neutrality of the United States, and was therefore, with the proceeds of the cargo, to be restored, according to the American practice, to the British owners at the date of capture. The case is a very interesting one from the standpoint of international law, and by reason of its importance, it is to be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States in order that, as far as the United States is concerned, a definite decision may be reached upon the points of law involved. The facts of the case and the reasoning of the District Court will, however, be set forth at this time and in this place.

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