State Constitutional Law in 1934–35

1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-630
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Taxes ◽  
State Constitutional Law

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.

Teaching Constitutional Law Using Real-life Examples: An Example from the Practice of Assent to Bills Passed by the National Assembly After the Tenure of Office of the President and the Assembly

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Chukwuka Onyeaku ◽  
Tonye Clinton Jaja
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

As a matter of tradition and necessity, teachers of constitutional law within Nigeria (and elsewhere) are often compelled to refer to case law to provide illustrations of principles of constitutional law as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). However, in some instances, where the said constitution does not provide explicit provisions, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to cite foreign case law as persuasive precedents. Still there are instances wherein there are neither foreign case law nor indigenous case law as precedents. In such situations, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to examine existing case law and relevant legislation until there is a pronouncement from either the Supreme Court or an alteration of the constitution by the National Assembly. One such situation is the subject of the analysis in this article: the situation whereby a president provides assent to bills after the expiration of the tenure of the National Assembly. As legislative tradition, the last session of each Chambers of the Nigeria’s National Assembly culminating each legislative term is usually a valedictory Session. Accordingly, Thursday, 6 June 2019 witnessed the last Session of the eighth National Assembly. As the president transmitted a Proclamation letter terminating the term of the eighth National Assembly inaugurated on 9 June 2015, it becomes paramount to examine the legal and constitutional implications of bills passed by the eighth National Assembly between 2016 and 2018 and up to 5 June 2019, which were assented to by the president after the tenure of the Assembly and office of the president. Thus, this article examines the constitutionality or otherwise of assenting to bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the president after the expiration of tenure of their offices. The article argues that the provisions of the 1999 Constitution had been violated when the president signed into law bills passed by the eighth National Assembly after the tenure of office of the president and the eighth National Assembly. It concludes that bills rejected by the president will require another legislative process of being passed into law again by the same Assembly or subsequent one before it can be assented to by the president. Failure to follow this constitutional process will render the assent unconstitutional.

Uncertain sovereignty: Ceylon as a Dominion 1948–1972

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1258-1282
Author(s):  
Rehan Abeyratne
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Minority Communities ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Abstract This article, a contribution to a symposium on dominion constitutionalism, looks at sovereignty in Ceylon’s Dominion period (1948–1972). While the Ceylon Constitution has been the subject of in-depth historical and sociopolitical study, it has received less attention from legal scholars. This article hopes to fill that gap. It analyzes Ceylon Supreme Court and Privy Council judgments from this era on both rights-based and structural questions of constitutional law. In each area, sovereignty-related concerns influenced the judicial approach and case outcomes. On fundamental rights, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council adopted a cautious approach, declining to invalidate legislation that had discriminatory effects on minority communities. This reluctance to entrench fundamental rights resulted, at least in part, from judges’ undue deference to the Ceylon Parliament, which was wrongly looked upon like its all-powerful British progenitor. On constitutional structure, the Ceylon Supreme Court deferred to Parliament even when legislation encroached into the judicial realm. The Privy Council, though, was not so passive. It upheld a separate, inviolable judicial power that Parliament could not legislate away. But by asserting itself as a check on legislative power, the Council—as a foreign judicial body intervening in Ceylonese affairs—stoked concerns that Ceylon was less than fully sovereign, which ultimately ended Dominion status.

Federalism and Unanimity: The Supreme Court and Constitutional Amendment

1983 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-770
Author(s):  
Samuel V. LaSelva
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
Canadian Federalism ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Political Compromise

AbstractThe Supreme Court's decisions on constitutional amendment made possible and then sanctioned a political compromise which conflicts with the logic of the only provision of the BNA Act dealing with amendments to the division of powers. The implications of section 94 have been overlooked partly because judges are ill-disposed to arguments based upon the structure of the BNA Act, and partly because of Frank Scott's misleading essay on the subject. Scott's centralist interpretation of section 94 is untenable, largely because that section does not restrict provincial sovereignty or federalism but gives constitutional recognition to them. Section 94 also implies a formal amending procedure of unanimity: neither unilateral action by the federal Parliament nor substantial provincial consent has any application to the division of powers. Since the centralist interpretation of the Canadian constitution cannot be reconciled with a significant provision of the BNA Act, a conception of Canadian federalism is required which gives greater recognition to the constitutional autonomy of the provinces.

State Constitutional Law in 1933–34

1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-627
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Stress And Strain ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Bar Association ◽  
Lord Chancellor ◽  
State Constitutional Law

More than ten years ago, the Earl of Birkenhead, former Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, speaking before the American Bar Association, expressed the belief that it was a question for the future to determine whether the barriers which the framers of the constitutions placed upon the complete freedom of legislative assemblies in the United States will prove equal to the emergencies as they arise and will be as adaptable to the stress and strain of political exigencies as the more flexible and more democratic arrangements of the British constitution. “Your constitution,” he remarked, “is expressed and defined in documents which can be pronounced upon by the Supreme Court. In this sense, your judges are the masters of your executive. Your constitution is a cast-iron document. It falls to be construed by the Supreme Court with the same sense of easy and admitted mastery as any ordinary contract. This circumstance provides a breakwater of enormous value against ill-considered and revolutionary changes.” On the other hand, so far as England is concerned, the genius of the Anglo-Saxon people has, rightly or wrongly, refused to shackle in the slightest degree the constitutional competence of later generations. Any law of Great Britain can be altered by Parliament and no court may challenge the constitutional force of an act of Parliament. It is on the whole premature, thought Lord Birkenhead, to decide whether you or we have been right.

The Israeli Constitution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sapir Gideon
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Israeli constitutional law is a sphere of many contradictions and traditions. Growing out of British law absorbed by the legal system of Mandate Palestine, Israeli constitutional law has followed the path of constitutional law based on unwritten constitutional principles. This book evaluates the development of the Israeli constitution from an unwritten British-style body of law to the declaration of the Basic Laws as the de facto Israeli constitution by the supreme court and on through the present day.The book is divided into a chronological history, devoted to a description of the process of establishing a constitution; and a thematic one, devoted to the review and evaluation of major constitutional issues that are also the subject of discussion and research in other countries, with emphasis on the unique characteristics of the Israeli case.

Public Law in the State Courts in 1927–1928

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-636
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Special Session ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
State Supreme Court ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court

Special Session—Power to Propose Constitutional Amendments Not Included in Governor's Call. In 1926 a special session of the Pennsylvania legislature proposed an amendment to the state constitution in the form of a new section, although the subject-matter of this amendment was not referred to in the governor's proclamation calling the session. In a taxpayer's action to prevent the submission to the people of this proposal it was alleged that the proceeding was in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 25, of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides: “When the General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling such session.” In Sweeney v. King the state supreme court held that a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment is not “legislation” within the meaning of this clause. In reaching this conclusion it relied heavily upon its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Griest in which it had held that a constitutional amendment is not “legislation” which must be submitted to the chief executive for his approval, a doctrine well established both in state and federal courts. An opposite result on the principal question was reached by the supreme court of California in People v. Curry. Here the restriction upon a called session of the legislature was held to preclude the proposal of a constitutional amendment. The purpose of the restriction was declared to be to regulate the duration of the session and keep down expenses, and this purpose, it was held, ought not to be defeated by a strained or highly technical interpretation.

scholarly journals A repercussão geral no recurso extraordinário e seu impacto na seara tributária / The overall impact on the extraordinary appeal and its impact on tax field

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastião Sergio da Silveira ◽  
Alcides Belfort da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Economic Point ◽  
The North ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Speedy Trial ◽  
The Impact

Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o impacto do filtro processual instituído pela Emenda Constitucional nº 45, qual seja, a repercussão geral no recurso extraordinário e o seu propósito de celeridade processual junto ao Supremo Tribunal Federal. Trata-se de um requisito de admissibilidade do recurso extraordinário, que foi inspirado no direito norte-americano e tem como principal objetivo solucionar a crise vivenciada pela Suprema Corte. Para a verificação da repercussão geral deverá ser levada em consideração a existência, ou não, de questões relevantes do ponto de vista econômico, político, social, ou jurídico, que ultrapassem os interesses subjetivos da causa (CPC, §1º do art. 543-A), atual redação dada pelo NCPC nos termos do artigo 1.035. É justamente neste ponto a pertinência que guarda com o Direito Tributário, vez que tal ramo (ou setor, como preferem outros) impacta na vida do cidadão de maneira incisiva. Assim, a maioria das causas tributárias, devido ao seu impacto social e jurídico, desembocam no Supremo Tribunal Federal, sendo que a Corte é responsável por delimitar o tema da forma mais consentânea possível.Abstract: This study aims to analyze the impact of procedural filter established by Constitutional Amendment 45, which is the general impact on the extraordinary appeal and its aimed speedy trial by the Supreme Court. This is an extraordinary appeal admissibility requirement, which was inspired by the North American law and aims to resolve the crisis experienced by the Supreme Court. To check the general defense must take into account the existence or not of relevant issues from the economic point of view, political, social, or legal, exceeding the subjective interests of the cause. It is precisely at this point that the relevance guard with the Tax Law, since this branch (or sector, as they prefer other) impacts the life of incisively citizen. Thus, most of the tax claims, due to their social and legal impact, leading into the Supreme Court, and the Court is responsible for defining the subject of more consistent as possible.

From an unconstitutional constitutional amendment to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID E LANDAU ◽  
ROSALIND DIXON ◽  
YANIV ROZNAI
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Potential Utility ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Global Constitutionalism

Abstract:The unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has emerged as a highly successful, albeit still controversial, export in comparative constitutional law. The doctrine has often been defended as protecting a delegation from the people to the political institutions that they created. Other work has noted the doctrine’s potential utility in guarding against abusive constitutionalism. In this article, we consider how these justifications fare when expanded to encompass claims against the original constitution itself, rather than a later amendment to the text. That is, beyond the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, can or should there be a doctrine of an unconstitutional constitution? Our question is spurred by a puzzling 2015 case from Honduras where the Supreme Court held an unamendable one-term limit on presidential terms, as well as protective provisions punishing attempts to alter that limit, to be unconstitutional. What is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982 constitution itself. Thus, this article examines the possibility of ‘an unconstitutional constitution’, what we predict to be the next trend in global constitutionalism.

State Constitutional Law in 1930–31

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 650-670
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
The State ◽  
Rural Districts ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Significant Case ◽  
State Constitutional Law

The most significant case in the field of state constitutional law decided during the past year is that of State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle, decided by the supreme court of Washington in 1930. This case held that an apportionment act is a “law,” and can be popularly initiated under the initiative and referendum provisions of the constitution of the state of Washington. The court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to accept a petition submitting to popular referendum a proposal to redistrict the state for purposes of representation in the legislature. The legislature had failed for many years to perform its constitutional duty to reapportion the state, and this case illustrates the most conclusive argument in favor of the use of the initiative and referendum for purposes of ordinary legislation, even though the only legislation to which it be applied be that of reapportionment. Many states are faced with a serious problem in connection with over-representation of rural districts in the legislature and under-representation of urban districts. The initiative and referendum seem to offer about the only way out of the difficulty if state legislatures refuse to correct the inequality. The only alternative is that we change our ideas as to the necessity of majority rule in the selection and composition of legislative bodies, a change which the rural districts appear already to have made.

State Constitutional Law in 1948–49

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-765
Author(s):  
Foster H. Sherwood
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Police Power ◽  
Governmental Organization ◽  
Full State ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Constitutional Law

The ever-increasing volume of litigation in state courts has made it necessary to exclude this year all decisions of courts other than those of last resort. In addition, with respect to subjects such as “police power” and “equal protection,” where classification or analysis of the decisions would require space out of all proportion to their importance, only a listing of the subjects involved in the case is attempted. The cases fall generally into the pattern used last year.I. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION1. Special Constitutional Provisions. The effective date of a new constitutional amendment was the subject of two decisions this year. In one, the amendment extending the term of office of county attorneys from two to four years was approved at a general election in which county attorneys were elected. The court held that the officers elected then were elected for the longer term, even though the amendment by its own terms did not become operative until the January following the election. This was so, even though the required local notice of the amendment omitted the effective date, since full state-wide notice was published by the secretary of state. The other case holds that the amendment becomes effective on the date of the canvass of votes rather than on the date of the election. Here, too, there were irregularities in the published notice in that it was not published in all counties on the same days and minor inconsistencies appeared in the printed versions. The court held that the purpose of notice had been substantially served.

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