Public Opinion and the Legislative Process

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 924-935 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank V. Cantwell

The rôle played by public opinion in a democracy, particularly as it affects the legislative process, has long been a subject for speculation by political scientists. The advent of controlled quota sampling permits of the study of this important relationship in measurable terms. The object of the present discussion is to trace the interaction of public opinion and the executive and legislative branches of government as they have dealt with a single public question—reorganization of the Supreme Court, as presented to Congress for consideration by President Roosevelt on February 5, 1937. Enlargement of the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen members was the most controversial feature of the general reorganization of the federal judiciary proposed by the President, aimed at speeding up the process of clearing cases through the federal court system, and making the system more “representative” of the wishes of the people.The debate on enlargement of the Supreme Court provides a useful and interesting case study for several reasons. The case as a public issue has a definite beginning and end, ranging from the proposal of the judiciary reform bill by the President on February 5 to the death of Senator Joseph T. Robinson on July 14, 1937. As it was debated by public and legislators, the issue was a relatively clear-cut one, uncomplicated by side issues or utterly foreign events that might have influenced the course of either legislators or the public. Finally, and of decided importance, the American Institute of Public Opinion made weekly measurements of opinion toward the proposal during the entire period that reorganization of the Court was a public question. This permits the correlation of reliable opinion samplings with events in the debate and the observation of their relationship.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C. Walsh

This Article challenges the unquestioned assumption of all contemporary scholars of federal jurisdiction that section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecutions. Section 25 has long been thought to be one of the most important provisions of the most important jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave concrete institutional shape to a federal judiciary only incompletely defined by Article III. And section 25 supplied a key piece of the structural relationship between the previously existing state court systems and the new federal court system that Congress constructed with the Act. It provided for Supreme Court appellate review of certain state court decisions denying the federal-law-based rights of certain litigants.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1139-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira

I show the intimate connection between the actions of the justices and support for the Supreme Court during one of the most critical periods of U.S. political history, the four months of 1937 during which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought legislation to “pack” the high bench with friendly personnel. Over the period from 3 February through 10 June 1937, the Gallup Poll queried national samples on 18 separate occasions about FDR's plan. These observations constitute the core of my analyses. I demonstrate the crucial influence of judicial behavior and the mass media in shaping public opinion toward the Supreme Court. This research illuminates the dynamics of public support for the justices, contributes to a clearer understanding of an important historical episode, shows the considerable impact of the mass media on public attitudes toward the Court, and adds more evidence on the role of political events in the making of public opinion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Dragutin Avramović

Following hypothesis of Andrew Watson, American professor of Psychiatry and Law, the author analyses certain psychological impacts on behavior of judges and examines the relationship between their idiosyncrasies and their judicial decisions. The survey encompasses the judges of Criminal Department of the Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic of Serbia and, also, for comparative reasons, the judges of Criminal Department of the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Considering the main issues there is no great discrepancy between answers given by the judges of the Supreme Court and those of the Basic Court. Most responses of the Serbian judges deviate from Watson's conclusions, namely: they do not admit that they feel frustrated due to heavy caseloads, the significant majority of judges are reluctant to acknowledge their prejudices and influence of biases on their ruling, the significant majority of judges are not burdened with the idea of possible misuse of their discretion, they nearly unanimously deny that public opinion and media pressure affect their rulings, etc. Generally, the judges in Serbia are not willing to admit that they cannot always overcome their own subjectivities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 223
Author(s):  
Thiago Aguiar Pádua

RESUMOEste artigo busca dialogar com recentemente artigo publicado pelo professor Eduardo Mendonça, no qual expõe a percepção de que o desgaste da representação político-parlamentar daria lugar a uma atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal como representante da opinião pública. Discordamos de sua construção teórica a partir de recurso metodológico da argumentação jurídica. Realizamos análise sobre dois documentos contextualizados de nossa historiografia constitucional, advindos as vésperas de dois períodos de exceção, e que também se fundamentavam no mesmo desgaste da representação político-parlamentar: 1) missiva escrita por Monteiro Lobato em 1924 ao presidente Artur Bernardes, e, portanto, as vésperas da revolução de 1930; e, 2) artigo-manifesto escrito por Goffredo Telles Jr em 1963, e assim sendo, as vésperas do golpe de Estado Civil-Militar de 1964. Articulamos discussão de premissas, utilizando o pensamento do jurista e sociólogo argentino Roberto Gargarella, discutindo as causas do desgaste da representação político-parlamentar, constatando que tal desgaste decorre da forma como as instituições foram desenhadas, de maneira a afastar a cidadania das discussões políticas, por temor do fenômeno democrático. Concluímos constatando que ao invés de se realizar empoderamento de um agente decisório, de duvidosa conotação democrática como o STF, mais adequado seria estimular e fomentar o acesso da população à “Sala de Máquinas da Constituição”.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Desgaste da Representação Política; Suprema Corte; Opinião Pública; Sala de Máquinas da Constituição.  ABSTRACTThis article is a dialogue with a recently published article by the professor Eduardo Mendonça, which exposes perception that the erosion of political and parliamentary representation would result in a performance of the Supreme Court as a representative body of public opinion. We disagree with his theoretical construction, articulating the critique from methodological analysis of the legal argument. We also analysis two documents of our constitutional history, coming on the eve of two periods of exception, which also were based on the same argument of erosion of political and parliamentary representation: 1) The letter written in 1924 by Monteiro Lobato to President Artur Bernardes, and therefore short before the 1930’s revolution. 2) The article-manifest written by Goffredo Telles Jr in 1963 a few days before the 1964 Civil-Military coup d’état. We articulate a discussion of premises, using the thought of the argentine sociologist and jurist Roberto Gargarella, discussing the causes of the erosion of political and parliamentary representation, noting that such thing arises from the way the political institutions were designed, in order to depart citizenship of political discussions, for the fear of the democratic phenomenon. We conclude noting that instead of performing empowerment of a decision-making agent of dubious democratic connotation, as the Supreme Court, most appropriate would be to encourage and foster the population's access to “Engine Room of Constitution”.KEYWORDS: Erosion of political and parliamentary representation; Supreme Court; Public Opinion; Engine Room of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Justin Crowe

This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.


Author(s):  
Dodek Adam ◽  
Way Rosemary Cairns

This chapter explains the constitutional status of the Supreme Court of Canada with attention to the Court’s composition, jurisdiction, and procedure. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 and considers whether and how that decision limits Parliament’s authority to make changes to the Court. Both the process for appointing Supreme Court of Canada justices and the process for appointing other federal judges to the country’s superior courts are explained. The authors argue that both appointment processes are inconsistent with democratic ideals of transparency and accountability. They examine the emerging scholarly and professional consensus on the importance of institutional diversity on the bench, and conclude that the continuing lack of diversity in the federal judiciary raises legitimate political and constitutional concerns.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Chukwuka Onyeaku ◽  
Tonye Clinton Jaja

As a matter of tradition and necessity, teachers of constitutional law within Nigeria (and elsewhere) are often compelled to refer to case law to provide illustrations of principles of constitutional law as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). However, in some instances, where the said constitution does not provide explicit provisions, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to cite foreign case law as persuasive precedents. Still there are instances wherein there are neither foreign case law nor indigenous case law as precedents. In such situations, teachers of constitutional law are compelled to examine existing case law and relevant legislation until there is a pronouncement from either the Supreme Court or an alteration of the constitution by the National Assembly. One such situation is the subject of the analysis in this article: the situation whereby a president provides assent to bills after the expiration of the tenure of the National Assembly. As legislative tradition, the last session of each Chambers of the Nigeria’s National Assembly culminating each legislative term is usually a valedictory Session. Accordingly, Thursday, 6 June 2019 witnessed the last Session of the eighth National Assembly. As the president transmitted a Proclamation letter terminating the term of the eighth National Assembly inaugurated on 9 June 2015, it becomes paramount to examine the legal and constitutional implications of bills passed by the eighth National Assembly between 2016 and 2018 and up to 5 June 2019, which were assented to by the president after the tenure of the Assembly and office of the president. Thus, this article examines the constitutionality or otherwise of assenting to bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the president after the expiration of tenure of their offices. The article argues that the provisions of the 1999 Constitution had been violated when the president signed into law bills passed by the eighth National Assembly after the tenure of office of the president and the eighth National Assembly. It concludes that bills rejected by the president will require another legislative process of being passed into law again by the same Assembly or subsequent one before it can be assented to by the president. Failure to follow this constitutional process will render the assent unconstitutional.


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