Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws. Second Edition. By Wilbur L. Fugate. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1973. pp. 491. Appendices and tables. Index. $35.00.

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 464-465
Author(s):  
Robert B. Haynes
1955 ◽  
Vol 53 (8) ◽  
pp. 1059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Nitschke

1958 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 665
Author(s):  
Gerhard A. Gesell ◽  
Wilbur Lindsay Fugate

1958 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 759
Author(s):  
George B. Turner ◽  
Wilbur L. Fugate

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.


2011 ◽  
pp. 122-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
A. Shastitko

The article focuses on economic analysis in cases of violation of the Russian antimonopoly legislation. It presents quantitative characteristics of various tools of economic analysis, prescribed by the rules of analysis and assessment of competition, developed by the Federal Antimonopoly Service. They are based on a small sample of cases filed by the Russian competition authorities. Sources of demand for higher standards of economic analysis in cases of violation of antitrust laws are under consideration.


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