The Expected Conditional Utility Theorem for the Case of Personal Probabilities and State-Conditional Utility Functions: A Proof and Some Notes

1979 ◽  
Vol 89 (356) ◽  
pp. 834 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. W. Jones-Lee
Keyword(s):  
Utility Functions ◽  
Conditional Utility

scholarly journals CUI Networks: A Graphical Representation for Conditional Utility Independence

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 83-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y. Engel ◽  
M. P. Wellman
Keyword(s):  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Multiattribute Utility ◽  
Preference Modeling ◽  
Network Construction ◽  
Functional Decomposition ◽  
Multiple Attributes ◽  
Utility Independence ◽  
Conditional Utility ◽  
Graph Nodes

We introduce CUI networks, a compact graphical representation of utility functions over multiple attributes. CUI networks model multiattribute utility functions using the well-studied and widely applicable utility independence concept. We show how conditional utility independence leads to an effective functional decomposition that can be exhibited graphically, and how local, compact data at the graph nodes can be used to calculate joint utility. We discuss aspects of elicitation, network construction, and optimization, and contrast our new representation with previous graphical preference modeling.

A Model for Applying Information and Utility Functions

1963 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harrah
Keyword(s):  
Utility Functions

scholarly journals Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1989-1995
Author(s):  
Gagan Goel ◽  
Vahab Mirrokni ◽  
Renato Paes Leme
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Limited Access ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Available Resources

We consider auction settings in which agents have limited access to monetary resources but are able to make payments larger than their available resources by taking loans with a certain interest rate. This setting is a strict generalization of budget constrained utility functions (which corresponds to infinite interest rates). Our main result is an incentive compatible and Pareto-efficient auction for a divisible multi-unit setting with 2 players who are able to borrow money with the same interest rate. The auction is an ascending price clock auction that bears some similarities to the clinching auction but at the same time is a considerable departure from this framework: allocated goods can be de-allocated in future and given to other agents and prices for previously allocated goods can be raised.

scholarly journals UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND FISCAL ILLUSION FROM GRANTS

1990 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-205
Author(s):  
J. PATRICK O'BRIEN ◽  
YEUNG-NAN SHIEH
Keyword(s):  
Utility Functions ◽  
Fiscal Illusion
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