PRAGMATISM AND PROBABILITY: RE-EXAMINING KEYNES’S THINKING ON PROBABILITY

As we celebrate the centenary of John Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921), we are still faced with unresolved, fundamental questions about his foray into the philosophy of probability. One of these unresolved questions concerns whether Keynes (1931) later changed his mind in response to intense criticism from Frank Ramsey (1922, 1931) and abandoned the logical theory of probability. This essay draws from Cheryl Misak’s recent biography of Frank Ramsey (2020) to argue that Ramsey had an even wider influence on Keynes’s work than has been recognized, and that this influence was not just on his philosophy of probability but also on his economics. Understood in this fuller context, it seems even more clear that Keynes embraced and built upon Ramsey’s subjective theory of probability in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936).

KEYNES’S TREATISE, STATISTICAL INFERENCE, AND STATISTICAL PRACTICE IN INTERWAR ECONOMICS IN THE UNITED STATES

In his Treatise on Probability John Maynard Keynes criticized the tools of statistical inference derived from probability that were coming into use in the early twentieth century, and outlined an alternative approach to statistical inference based on the logic of induction. This essay argues that Keynes’s ideas were embraced and echoed by several leading US economists during the 1920s and 1930s, including those developing and applying the most sophisticated statistical methods of the day. These economists expressed views regarding statistical inference that were quite similar to those found in Keynes’s Treatise, often citing Keynes as an authority in support. Also, the inferential methods recommended and actually employed by these writers were consistent with Keynes’s ideas about the proper methods of statistical inference.

READING KEYNES’S POLICY PAPERS THROUGH THE PRISM OF HIS TREATISE ON PROBABILITY: INFORMATION, EXPECTATIONS, AND REVISION OF PROBABILITIES IN ECONOMIC POLICY

When scholars investigate the legacy of John Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921) for the development of Keynes’s thinking, the attention usually focuses on the connections among Keynes’s probability theory, his conception of decision-making under uncertainty, and the theory of the functioning of the macroeconomic system that derives from it—through the marginal efficiency of capital, the preference for liquidity, and the self-referential functioning of financial markets. By contrast, this paper aims to investigate the connections between Keynes’s probability theory, on the one hand, and his economic policy recommendations, on the other. It concentrates on the policy recommendations defended by Keynes during the Great Depression but also after the General Theory. Keynes’s economic policy can be understood as a framework for decision-making in situations of uncertainty: fiscal policy aims to induce private agents to change their “rational” probability statements, while monetary policy aims to allow more weight to these statements.

THE GERMAN ANTI-KEYNES? ON WALTER EUCKEN’S MACROECONOMICS

The work of Walter Eucken (1891–1950), founder of German ordoliberalism, is often described as being in direct opposition to that of John Maynard Keynes. Our paper challenges this claim by making two main arguments. First, we show that Eucken supported a proto-Keynesian stimulus program at the height of the Great Depression, the so-called Lautenbach plan of 1931. Second, we analyze his critique of full employment policy, which reveals that Eucken’s approach to solving macroeconomic problems is fundamentally different from, if not necessarily contrary to, that of Keynes.