A formalization of the theory of ordinal numbers

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaisi Takeuti
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Natural Extension ◽  
Mathematical Induction ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
First Order ◽  
Recursive Functions ◽  
Ordinal Numbers ◽  
Primitive Recursive ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

Although Peano's arithmetic can be developed in set theories, it can also be developed independently. This is also true for the theory of ordinal numbers. The author formalized the theory of ordinal numbers in logical systems GLC (in [2]) and FLC (in [3]). These logical systems which contain the concept of ‘arbitrary predicates’ or ‘arbitrary functions’ are of higher order than the first order predicate calculus with equality. In this paper we shall develop the theory of ordinal numbers in the first order predicate calculus with equality as an extension of Peano's arithmetic. This theory will prove to be easy to manage and fairly powerful in the following sense: If A is a sentence of the theory of ordinal numbers, then A is a theorem of our system if and only if the natural translation of A in set theory is a theorem of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. It will be treated as a natural extension of Peano's arithmetic. The latter consists of axiom schemata of primitive recursive functions and mathematical induction, while the theory of ordinal numbers consists of axiom schemata of primitive recursive functions of ordinal numbers (cf. [5]), of transfinite induction, of replacement and of cardinals. The latter three axiom schemata can be considered as extensions of mathematical induction.In the theory of ordinal numbers thus developed, we shall construct a model of Zermelo-Fraenkel's set theory by following Gödel's construction in [1]. Our intention is as follows: We shall define a relation α ∈ β as a primitive recursive predicate, which corresponds to F′ α ε F′ β in [1]; Gödel defined the constructible model Δ using the primitive notion ε in the universe or, in other words, using the whole set theory.

A complete infinitary logic

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 730-746
Author(s):  
Kenneth Slonneger
Keyword(s):  
Natural Extension ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Cut Elimination ◽  
Infinitary Logic ◽  
Logical System ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
First Order ◽  
Ordinal Numbers ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

This paper is concerned with the proof theoretic development of certain infinite languages. These languages contain the usual infinite conjunctions and disjunctions, but in addition to homogeneous quantifiers such as ∀x0x1x2 … and ∃y0y1y2 …, we shall investigate particular subclasses of the dependent quantifiers described by Henkin [1]. The dependent quantifiers of Henkin can be thought of as partially ordered quantifiers defined by a function from one set to the power set of another set. This function assigns to each existentially bound variable, the set of universally bound variables on which it depends.The natural extension of Gentzen's first order predicate calculus to an infinite language with homogeneous quantifiers results in a system that is both valid and complete, and in which a cut elimination theorem can be proved [2]. The problem then arises of devising, if possible, a logical system dealing with general dependent quantifiers that is valid and complete. In this paper a system is presented that is valid and complete for an infinite language with homogeneous quantifiers and dependent quantifiers that are anti-well-ordered, for example, … ∀x2∃y2∀x1∃y1∀x0∃y0.Certain notational conventions will be employed in this paper. Greek letters will be used for ordinal numbers. The ordinal ω is the set of all natural numbers, and 2ω is the set of all ω -sequences of elements of 2 = {0,1}. The power set of S is denoted by P(S). μα[A(α)] stands for the smallest ordinal α such that A (α) holds.

On an Ackermann-type set theory

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-412
Author(s):  
John Lake
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Measurable Cardinal ◽  
Large Cardinal ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Individual Constant ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus ◽  
Universal Closure

Ackermann's set theory A* is usually formulated in the first order predicate calculus with identity, ∈ for membership and V, an individual constant, for the class of all sets. We use small Greek letters to represent formulae which do not contain V and large Greek letters to represent any formulae. The axioms of A* are the universal closures ofwhere all free variables are shown in A4 and z does not occur in the Θ of A2.A+ is a generalisation of A* which Reinhardt introduced in [3] as an attempt to provide an elaboration of Ackermann's idea of “sharply delimited” collections. The language of A+ is that of A*'s augmented by a new constant V′, and its axioms are A1–A3, A5, V ⊆ V′ and the universal closure ofwhere all free variables are shown.Using a schema of indescribability, Reinhardt states in [3] that if ZF + ‘there exists a measurable cardinal’ is consistent then so is A+, and using [4] this result can be improved to a weaker large cardinal axiom. It seemed plausible that A+ was stronger than ZF, but our main result, which is contained in Theorem 5, shows that if ZF is consistent then so is A+, giving an improvement on the above results.

Natural models and Ackermann-type set theories

1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Lake
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Individual Constant ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

Our results concern the natural models of Ackermann-type set theories, but they can also be viewed as results about the definability of ordinals in certain sets.Ackermann's set theory A was introduced in [1] and it is now formulated in the first order predicate calculus with identity, using ∈ for membership and an individual constant V for the class of all sets. We use the letters ϕ, χ, θ, and χ to stand for formulae which do not contain V and capital Greek letters to stand for any formulae. Then, the axioms of A* are the universal closures ofwhere all the free variables are shown in A4 and z does not occur in the Θ of A2. A is the theory A* − A5.Most of our notation is standard (for instance, α, β, γ, δ, κ, λ, ξ are variables ranging over ordinals) and, in general, we follow the notation of [7]. When x ⊆ Rα, we use Df(Rα, x) for the set of those elements of Rα which are definable in 〈Rα, ∈〉, using a first order ∈-formula and parameters from x.We refer the reader to [7] for an outline of the results which are known about A, but we shall summarise those facts which are frequently used in this paper.

A reduction class containing formulas with one monadic predicate and one binary function symbol

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Charles E. Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Conjunctive Normal Form ◽  
Function Symbol ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Binary Function ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Reduction Class ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

AbstractA new reduction class is presented for the satisfiability problem for well-formed formulas of the first-order predicate calculus. The members of this class are closed prenex formulas of the form ∀x∀yC. The matrix C is in conjunctive normal form and has no disjuncts with more than three literals, in fact all but one conjunct is unary. Furthermore C contains but one predicate symbol, that being unary, and one function symbol which symbol is binary.

Resolution in type theory

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B. Andrews
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Type Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Higher Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

In [8] J. A. Robinson introduced a complete refutation procedure called resolution for first order predicate calculus. Resolution is based on ideas in Herbrand's Theorem, and provides a very convenient framework in which to search for a proof of a wff believed to be a theorem. Moreover, it has proved possible to formulate many refinements of resolution which are still complete but are more efficient, at least in many contexts. However, when efficiency is a prime consideration, the restriction to first order logic is unfortunate, since many statements of mathematics (and other disciplines) can be expressed more simply and naturally in higher order logic than in first order logic. Also, the fact that in higher order logic (as in many-sorted first order logic) there is an explicit syntactic distinction between expressions which denote different types of intuitive objects is of great value where matching is involved, since one is automatically prevented from trying to make certain inappropriate matches. (One may contrast this with the situation in which mathematical statements are expressed in the symbolism of axiomatic set theory.).

scholarly journals On a Propositional Calculus Whose Decision Problem is Recursively Unsolvable

1970 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 145-152
Author(s):  
Akira Nakamura
Keyword(s):  
Decision Problem ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Reduction Theorem ◽  
List Type ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

The purpose of this paper is to present a propositional calculus whose decision problem is recursively unsolvable. The paper is based on the following ideas: (1) Using Löwenheim-Skolem’s Theorem and Surányi’s Reduction Theorem, we will construct an infinitely many-valued propositional calculus corresponding to the first-order predicate calculus.(2) It is well known that the decision problem of the first-order predicate calculus is recursively unsolvable.(3) Thus it will be shown that the decision problem of the infinitely many-valued propositional calculus is recursively unsolvable.

The relation of A to Prov ˹A˺ in the Lindenbaum sentence algebra

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. F. Kent
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Normal Forms ◽  
Order Relation ◽  
Mathematical Induction ◽  
Axiomatic Theory ◽  
Recursive Functions ◽  
Primitive Recursive

Let U be a consistent axiomatic theory containing Robinson's Q [TMRUT, p. 51]. In order for the results below to be of interest, U must be powerful enough to carry out certain arguments involving versions of the “derivability conditions,” DC(i) to DC(iii) below, of [HBGM, p. 285], [F60, Theorem 4.7], or [L55]. Thus it must contain, at least, mathematical induction for formulas whose prenex normal forms contain at most existential quantifiers. For convenience, U is assumed also to contain symbols for primitive recursive functions and relations, and their defining equations. One of these is used to form the standard provability predicate, Prov ˹A˺, “there exists a number which is the Gödel number of a proof of A.” Upper corners denote numerals for Gödel numbers for the enclosed sentences, and parentheses are often omitted in their presence.This paper contains some results concerning the relation between the sentence A, and the sentence Prov ˹A˺ in the Lindenbaum Sentence Algebra (LSA) for U, the Boolean algebra induced by the pre-order relation A ≤ B ⇔ ⊦A → B. Half of the answer is provided by a theorem of Löb [L55], which states that ⊦Prov ˹A˺ → A ⇔ ⊦A. Hence, in the presence of DC(iii), below, it is never true that Prov ˹A˺ < A in the LSA. However, there is a large and interesting set of sentences, denoted here by Γ, for which A < Prov ⌜A⌝.

A weak absolute consistency proof for some systems of illative combinatory logic

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 771-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.W. Bunder
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Combinatory Logic ◽  
Weak Consistency ◽  
Consistency Proof ◽  
First Order ◽  
Formal Systems ◽  
Elementary Methods ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Strongly Consistent ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

A large number of formal systems based on combinatory logic or λ-calculus have been extended to include first order predicate calculus. Several of these however have been shown to be inconsistent, all, as far as the author knows, in the strong sense that all well formed formulas (which here include all strings of symbols) are provable. We will call the corresponding consistency notion—an arbitrary wff ⊥ is provable—weak consistency. We will say that a system is strongly consistent if no formula and its negation are provable.Now for some systems, such as that of Kuzichev [11], the strong and weak consistency notions are equivalent, but in the systems of [5] and [6], which we will be considering, they are not. Each of these systems is strong enough to have all of ZF set theory, except Grounding and Choice, interpretable in it, and the system of [5] can also encompass first order arithmetic (see [7]). It therefore seems unlikely that a strong consistency result could be proved for these systems using elementary methods. In this paper however, we prove the weak consistency of both these systems by means that could be formulated, at least within the theory of [5]. The method also applies to the typed systems of Curry, Hindley and Seldin [10] and to Seldin's generalised types [12].

Infinitary logic and admissible sets

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Barwise
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Infinitary Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Admissible Sets ◽  
Classical Language ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

In recent years much effort has gone into the study of languages which strengthen the classical first-order predicate calculus in various ways. This effort has been motivated by the desire to find a language which is(I) strong enough to express interesting properties not expressible by the classical language, but(II) still simple enough to yield interesting general results. Languages investigated include second-order logic, weak second-order logic, ω-logic, languages with generalized quantifiers, and infinitary logic.

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