An intuitionistic proof of Tychonoff's theorem

1992 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Coquand

Tychonoff's theorem states that a product of compact spaces is compact. In [3], P. Johnstone presents a proof of Tychonoff's theorem in a “localic” framework. The surprise is that the point-free formulation of Tychonoff's theorem is provable without the axiom of choice, whereas in the usual formulation it is equivalent to the axiom of choice (see Kelley [5]).The proof given in [3], however, is classical and seems to use the replacement axiom of Zermelo-Fraenkel. The aim of this paper is to present what we believe to be a more direct proof, which is intuitionistic and can be proved using as primitive only the notion of inductive definition, as it is for instance presented in Martin-Löf [6]. One main point of the paper is to show that the theory of locales can be developed rather naturally in the framework of inductive definitions. We think that our arguments can be presented in the constructive set theory of Aczel [2].The paper is organized as follows. In §1 we show the argument in the case of a product of two spaces. This proof has a direct generalisation to the case of a product over a set with a decidable equality.§1. Product of two spaces. We first recall a possible definition of a point-free space (see Johnstone [3] or Vickers [10]). It is a poset (X, ≤), together with a meet operation ab, written multiplicatively, and, for each a ∈ X, a set Cov(a) of subsets of {x ∈ X ∣ x ≤ a}. We ask that if M ∈ Cov(a) and b ≤ a, then {bs ∈ s ∈ M} ∈ Cov(b). This property of Cov will be called the axiom of covering. The elements of Cov(u) are called basic covers of u ∈ X.

2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis

AbstractWe establish the following results:1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent:(a) The Tychonoff product of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact.(b) The union of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable.2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1]Iwhich consists offunctions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory.3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0 (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity).4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ0-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ0many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0.


1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (62) ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
José Alfredo Amor

The so called Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is the sentence: "If A is an infinile set whose cardinal number is K and 2K denotes the cardinal number of the set P(A) of subsets of A (the power set of A), and K + denotes the succesor cardinal of K, then 2K = K +". The Continuum Hypothesis (CH) asserts the particular case K = o. It is clear that GCH implies CH. Another equivalent version of GCH, is the sentence: 'Any subset of the set of subsets of a given infinite set is or of cardinality less or equal than the cardinality of the given set, or of the cardinality of all the set of subsets". Gödel in 1939, and Cohen in 1963, settled the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and of its negation not-AC, respectively, with respecllo the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). On the other hand, Gödel in 1939, and Cohen in 1963 settled too, the relative consistency of GCH , CH and of its negations not-GCH, not-CH, respectively, with respect to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZF + AC or ZFC). From these results we know that GCH and AC are undecidable sentences in ZF set theory and indeed, the most famous undecidable sentences in ZF; but, which is the relation between them? From the above results, in the theory ZF + AC is not demonstrated GCH; it is clear then that AC doesn't imply GCH in ZF theory, Bul does GCH implies AC in ZF theory? The answer is yes! or equivalently, there is no model of ZF +GCH + not-AC. A very easy proof can be given if we have an adecuate definition of cardinal number of a set, that doesn't depend of AC but depending from the Regularity Axiom, which asserls that aIl sets have a range, which is an ordinal number associated with its constructive complexity. We define the cardinal number of A, denoted |A|, as foIlows: |A|= { The least ordinal number equipotent with A, if A is well orderable The set of all sets equipotent with A and of minimum range, in other case. It is clear that without AC, may be not ordinal cardinals and all cardinals are ordinal cardinals if all sets are well orderable (AC). Now we formulate: GCH*: For all ordinal cardinal I<, 2K = I< + In the paper is demonstrated that this formulation GCH* is implied by the traditional one, and indeed equivalent to it. Lemma, The power set of any well orderable set is well orderable if and only if AC. This is one of the many equivalents of AC in ZF,due lo Rubin, 1960. Proposition. In ZF is a theorem: GCH* implies AC. Supose GCH*. Let A be a well orderable set; then |A| = K an ordinal cardinal, so A is equipotent with K and then P~A) is equipotent with P(K); therefore |P(A)I|= |P(K)| = 2K = K+. But then |P(A)|= K+ and P(A) 'is equipotent with K+ and K+ is an ordinal cardinal; therefore P(A) is well orderable with the well order induced by means of the bijection, from the well order of K+. Corolary: In ZF are theorems: GCH impIies AC and GCH is equivalent to GCH*. We see from this proof, that GCH asserts that the cardinal number of the power set of a well orderable set A is an ordinal, which is equivalent to AC, but GCH asserts also that that ordinal cardinal is |A|+ , the ordinal cardinal succesor of the ordinal cardinal of the well orderable set A.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev

The link between the high-order metaphysics and abstractions, on the one hand, and choice in the foundation of set theory, on the other hand, can distinguish unambiguously the “good” principles of abstraction from the “bad” ones and thus resolve the “bad company problem” as to set theory. Thus it implies correspondingly a more precise definition of the relation between the axiom of choice and “all company” of axioms in set theory concerning directly or indirectly abstraction: the principle of abstraction, axiom of comprehension, axiom scheme of specification, axiom scheme of separation, subset axiom scheme, axiom scheme of replacement, axiom of unrestricted comprehension, axiom of extensionality, etc.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


Author(s):  
Cesare Gallozzi

Abstract We introduce a family of (k, h)-interpretations for 2 ≤ k ≤ ∞ and 1 ≤ h ≤ ∞ of constructive set theory into type theory, in which sets and formulas are interpreted as types of homotopy level k and h, respectively. Depending on the values of the parameters k and h, we are able to interpret different theories, like Aczel’s CZF and Myhill’s CST. We also define a proposition-as-hproposition interpretation in the context of logic-enriched type theories. The rest of the paper is devoted to characterising and analysing the interpretations considered. The formulas valid in the prop-as-hprop interpretation are characterised in terms of the axiom of unique choice. We also analyse the interpretations of CST into homotopy type theory, providing a comparative analysis with Aczel’s interpretation. This is done by formulating in a logic-enriched type theory the key principles used in the proofs of the two interpretations. Finally, we characterise a class of sentences valid in the (k, ∞)-interpretations in terms of the ΠΣ axiom of choice.


1995 ◽  
Vol 06 (03) ◽  
pp. 203-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
YUKIYOSHI KAMEYAMA

This paper studies an extension of inductive definitions in the context of a type-free theory. It is a kind of simultaneous inductive definition of two predicates where the defining formulas are monotone with respect to the first predicate, but not monotone with respect to the second predicate. We call this inductive definition half-monotone in analogy of Allen’s term half-positive. We can regard this definition as a variant of monotone inductive definitions by introducing a refined order between tuples of predicates. We give a general theory for half-monotone inductive definitions in a type-free first-order logic. We then give a realizability interpretation to our theory, and prove its soundness by extending Tatsuta’s technique. The mechanism of half-monotone inductive definitions is shown to be useful in interpreting many theories, including the Logical Theory of Constructions, and Martin-Löf’s Type Theory. We can also formalize the provability relation “a term p is a proof of a proposition P” naturally. As an application of this formalization, several techniques of program/proof-improvement can be formalized in our theory, and we can make use of this fact to develop programs in the paradigm of Constructive Programming. A characteristic point of our approach is that we can extract an optimization program since our theory enjoys the program extraction theorem.


Axioms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitri Shakhmatov ◽  
Víctor Yañez

We give a “naive” (i.e., using no additional set-theoretic assumptions beyond ZFC, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory augmented by the Axiom of Choice) example of a Boolean topological group G without infinite separable pseudocompact subsets having the following “selective” compactness property: For each free ultrafilter p on the set N of natural numbers and every sequence ( U n ) of non-empty open subsets of G, one can choose a point x n ∈ U n for all n ∈ N in such a way that the resulting sequence ( x n ) has a p-limit in G; that is, { n ∈ N : x n ∈ V } ∈ p for every neighbourhood V of x in G. In particular, G is selectively pseudocompact (strongly pseudocompact) but not selectively sequentially pseudocompact. This answers a question of Dorantes-Aldama and the first listed author. The group G above is not pseudo- ω -bounded either. Furthermore, we show that the free precompact Boolean group of a topological sum ⨁ i ∈ I X i , where each space X i is either maximal or discrete, contains no infinite separable pseudocompact subsets.


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