Consumer Preferences, Linear Demand Functions and Aggregation in Competitive Asset Markets

1979 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Milne
2014 ◽  
Vol 912-914 ◽  
pp. 1865-1873
Author(s):  
Xing You Gao

Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-197
Author(s):  
Gerasimos Soldatos

Abstract This paper introduces into the discussion of the stability of quantity-oligopoly equilibrium, the role that the slope of the marginal utility curve and of market entry in shaping the equilibrium and its stability. It does so by considering inverse multivariate linear demand functions and the notion of stability related to multivariate mean value theorem. The equilibrium cluster of Cournot sellers is determined by the stability dictated by this theorem and the rate of decline of the marginal utility of the product under consideration. Strategic complementarity is found to be the case under product heterogeneity, while the strategic substitutability associated with product homogeneity, induces a modification of Cournot limit theorem.


1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gershon Alperovich ◽  
Itzhak Weksler

1984 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-335
Author(s):  
William Blozan ◽  
Paul Prabhaker

First, the authors seek to dispel any misunderstanding that standard price discrimination theory prescribes a profit-maximizing aggregation criterion. They argue that Tollefson and Lessig misinterpreted this theory, but prove that the latter authors’ unwarranted implication is justified in the case of linear demand functions and constant marginal costs. Second, the authors argue that the “theoretical evidence” presented by Tollefson and Lessig against using elasticities to cluster segments is, in fact, no evidence at all, and that their simulations may be valid only under extreme conditions. Finally, a new theorem is offered which provides some support for using clustering techniques to disaggregate markets.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-244
Author(s):  
Winston W. Chang ◽  
Tai-Liang Chen

This note derives a new formula for determining a monopolist’s optimal multitier pricing scheme for any given number of tiers. It further characterizes Gabor’s ( Review of Economic Studies) two-tier pari passu marginal revenue function to the [Formula: see text]-tier case. By introducing the individual tier’s marginal revenue and the pari passu marginal revenue in a linear demand case, this note provides a perceptive graphical representation of the optimal pricing scheme, revealing that all tiers’ outputs are equal, the last tier’s price is always higher than the marginal cost, and an increase in the number of tiers increases social welfare. In a class of nonlinear demand functions, it shows that starting from the first tier, the tiers’ outputs are monotonically increasing (decreasing) if the demand function is strictly convex (concave). It also shows that the equal-tier-output property preserves in the linear demand case with the total output fixed as a constraint. JEL Classification: D01, D21, D42, L12, L21


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Adams

This article presents a student exercise on the logic underlying demand for quality-differentiated products. The argument builds and extends on basic constructs from undergraduate microeconomics, developing a linear demand structure to reflect consumer preferences for quality variation and a brief critique of market responses to those preferences that indicates potentially greater efficiency loses under monopoly once the possibility of quality distortions are accounted for. Various policy extensions are noted. These include applications in utility pricing tied to quality variations in service reliability, the potentially disproportionate impact on lower income households of quality distortions created by monopoly practices, and the potential of profligate resource use by monopolies which are shown to favor higher over lower quality products. Following along with the student exercise is a series of instructor notes with references to the scholarly literature and possible elaborations on various aspects of the exercise that instructors may chose to address. JEL Classifications: D4, D41, D42


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