The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations, Results. Edited by Roy S. Lee. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999. Pp. xxxv, 659. Index. Fl 295; $177; £103.25.

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 218-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin B. Ferencz
2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 370-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Kaul

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was officially opened in The Hague on March 11, 2003, in a special ceremony attended by Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands and United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan. Less than four years after the historic breakthrough by the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome on July 17, 1998, the Statute of the ICC had entered into force on July 1, 2002. The required number of sixty ratifications, which is laid down in Article 126, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, was reached much faster than for other comparable multilateral treaties and faster than had been expected by the global public. Secretary-General Annan attracted widespread attention when he observed that July 1, 2002, was a decisive landmark in breaking with the cynical worldview of people like Joseph Stalin, who is alleged to have remarked that while “a single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.”


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Patrick Kimani

The development of international criminal law in the last seven decades has seen a gradual erosion of the integrity of immunities for heads of states. The journey from Nuremberg to The Hague has resulted in a permanent international criminal court. Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) disregards immunities as an effective bar to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Heads of states have been stripped of their ‘invisibility cloak’ from international criminal prosecutions. The Rome Statute places its reliance on the situation state’s authorities to cooperate with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes. A special tension is noticeable in circumstances where an incumbent head of state is accused at ICC while his or her state is placed under the general cooperation obligation. This tension is clearly manifest in the two criminal processes against Uhuru Kenyatta and Al Bashir. Bearing in mind the significant political muscle a sitting head of state wields in their state, it is quite likely that their state’s authorities will be very reluctant to discharge their cooperation obligations. The prosecution of sitting heads of states remains a challenge. Is it time to rethink the structure of the ICC or the implementation of the Statute?


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 60 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 60 governs the initial appearance of the suspect before the Court. It mainly concerns the issue of interim release once the suspect is in the Court's custody. The title of article 60, ‘Initial proceedings before the Court’, is only partially accurate because a great deal of judicial activity occurs between the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear, governed by article 58, the arrest in the custodial State pursuant to article 59, and the confirmation hearing held in accordance with article 61. This process typically takes about a year. With some exceptions, the suspect will spend this period in the Court's Detention Unit in The Hague.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 62 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 62 establishes the seat of the Court as the place of the trial. International courts have a ‘seat’. It is where they ‘sit’. Article 3, entitled ‘Seat of the Court’, specifies that the seat ‘shall be established at The Hague in the Netherlands’. It does not state clearly that the Court is to sit, as a general rule, in The Hague, but this is implied by paragraph 3 of article 3. Article 62 seems somewhat redundant and even confusing. Taken literally, its placement in Part 6 of the Statute (‘The Trial’) might be taken to indicate, a contrario, that other proceedings, both pre- and post-trial, must be held in The Hague at the seat of the Court. But that seems to be an absurd result.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 3 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article consists of three paragraphs. Article 3(1) establishes The Hague as the seat of the Court. Paragraph (1) is mandatory, and does not allow for the seat of the Court to be located elsewhere, absent an amendment of the Statute. The Statute also specifies that the Netherlands is the ‘host State’. Article 3(2) requires that there be a Headquarters Agreement between the Court and the host State. Article 3(3) states that The Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable, ‘as provided in the Statute’.


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 878-893
Author(s):  
Tanja Altunjan

AbstractThe adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was widely lauded as a success with regard to the recognition and potential prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence. More than twenty years later, however, many observers are disillusioned with the ICC’s dire track record concerning the implementation of its progressive legal framework. In many cases, the Court and particularly its Prosecutor have been criticized for failing to adequately address and prioritize sexual violence, culminating in only a single final conviction since 2002. Nevertheless, the ICC’s emerging practice shows progress with regard to the conceptual understanding of conflict-related sexual violence and the realization of the Statute’s full potential in ensuring accountability for sexual crimes. Taking into account the evolving jurisprudence, the Article explores the persisting challenges and the perceived gap between aspirations and reality regarding the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICC.


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