Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 879-912 ◽  

After seventy-two days of NATO's air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) (FRY), FRYPresident Slobodan Milošević on June 3, 1999 accepted an international peace proposal to end the conflict concerning Kosovo. The proposal was developed in Bonn after lengthy discussions between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, EU envoy (and Finnish President) Martti Ahtisaari, and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, and then presented to President Milosevic by President Ahtisaari and Mr. Chernomyrdin. Although it contained several elements previously unacceptable to the FRY, Mr. Milošević accepted the proposal due to a relentless bombing campaign against FRY tanks, artillery, and ground forces in Kosovo, as well as the destruction of oil refineries, bridges, and power stations elsewhere in Serbia; a resurgence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a ground force; and the decision of Russia to find common ground with NATO prior to a regular meeting in early June of the seven leading industrial countries (Group of Seven or “G-7”) and Russia.

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4I) ◽  
pp. 327-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Lipsey

I am honoured to be invited to give this lecture before so distinguished an audience of development economists. For the last 21/2 years I have been director of a project financed by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and composed of a group of scholars from Canada, the United States, and Israel.I Our brief is to study the determinants of long term economic growth. Although our primary focus is on advanced industrial countries such as my own, some of us have come to the conclusion that there is more common ground between developed and developing countries than we might have first thought. I am, however, no expert on development economics so I must let you decide how much of what I say is applicable to economies such as your own. Today, I will discuss some of the grand themes that have arisen in my studies with our group. In the short time available, I can only allude to how these themes are rooted in our more detailed studies. In doing this, I must hasten to add that I speak for myself alone; our group has no corporate view other than the sum of our individual, and very individualistic, views.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-517
Author(s):  
Marian Nash (Leich)

On March 3,1997, President William J. Clinton transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as a treaty the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders, signed at Hong Kong on December 20,1996. In his letter of transmittal, President Clinton pointed out that, upon its entry into force, the Agreement would “enhance cooperation between the law enforcement communities of the United States and Hong Kong, and … provide a framework and basic protections for extraditions after the reversion of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997.” The President continued: Given the absence of an extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, this Treaty would provide the means to continue an extradition relationship with Hong Kong after reversion and avoid a gap in law enforcement. It will thereby make a significant contribution to international law enforcement efforts.The provisions of this Agreement follow generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. In addition, the Agreement contains several provisions specially designed in light of the particular status of Hong Kong. The Agreement’s basic protections for fugitives are also made expressly applicable to fugitives surrendered by the two parties before the new treaty enters into force.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-348
Author(s):  
Marian Nash Leich

On January 7, 1997, President William J. Clinton transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the following Protocols to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: (A) the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices, adopted at Geneva on May 3, 1996 (Protocol II, or amended Mines Protocol); (B) the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, adopted at Geneva on October 10, 1980 (Protocol III, or the Incendiary Weapons Protocol) ; and (C) the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, adopted at Geneva on May 3, 1996 (Protocol IV).


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-336

The material for this section is compiled by Stephen L. Gibson, attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State. Jerome H. Silber, of the Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, has provided material originating in that Department.


1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
Marian Nash

On September 8, 1992, President George Bush transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted at New York on May 9, 1992, by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change and signed on behalf of the United States at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro on June 12, 1992.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document