Nuclear weapons after the comprehensive test ban: implications for modernization and proliferation

1996 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 802-802
Author(s):  
Ian Hamer
Author(s):  
V. Belous

Referring to recent history, the author examines specific stages in nuclear weapons development, which, for their part, determined the fundamentals of the control system construction. The importance of the international Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 2010 is noted, where serious attention was paid to the primary component of nuclear disarmament – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which largely predetermines what the future world will be – nuclear or nuclear free.


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (IV) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Anum Riaz ◽  
Muqarrab Akbar

The arrival of nuclear weapons was detrimental in changing the nature of warfare; duringWWII, we used nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities. The catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons made the pioneers apprehensive about the spread of nuclear technology across the globe. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR) is a set of international rules, norms, initiatives, agreements, arrangements, bilateral and multilateral treaties to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the backbone of NNPR. This paper discusses the significance of NNPR and will focus on how Pakistan fits into the bigger picture of the NNPR as a nuclear state. This research study will further analyze the prospects and challenges for Pakistan viz a viz the NNPR. It will specifically focus on Pakistan's official position on joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and the two relevant Export Control Regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime). Moreover, the challenges Pakistan faces viz-a-viz these treaties and arrangements will be highlighted. Recommendations will be provided based on the prospects of how Pakistan can overcome these challenges.


1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is examined in nuclear weapons related negotiations in the 1990s regarding the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Such negotiations have been an occasion for NGOs to voice public aspirations for an end to the nuclear threat, and in this way to help stimulate some progress, but generally not to influence substantively the terms of the instruments under negotiation. An NGO initiative led to the failed PTBT Amendment Conference which however helped to spur the eventual successful negotiation of the CTBT. At the NPT Extension Conference, one coalition of NGOs assisted in the achievement of US government objectives of obtaining indefinite extension and commitments to negotiation of a CTBT and a fissile materials production cutoff. Other NGOs advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons failed to decisively affect the outcome of the Conference, but the experience served as the catalyst for the development of an ongoing large international network. NGOs seeking the express criminalization of the employment of nuclear weapons in the ICC Statute succeeded only in preserving issues with regard to indiscriminate weapons for future negotiations. NGOs' access to the negotiations regarding the CTBT and NPT was extremely limited. Effectiveness of NGOs in this field could be enhanced by increasing access; by forming closer working relationships with states supporting nuclear disarmament; and by intensifying the interaction between NGO advocacy at the national and international levels.


1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis René Beres

America's current nuclear strategy seeks to improve deterrence with a counterforce targeting plan that exceeds the requirements of mutual assured destruction. This “countervailing” nuclear strategy codifies an enlarged spectrum of retaliatory options. The author argues, however, that the countervailing strategy is based upon a number of implausible and contradictory assumptions, and that it actually degrades the overriding objective of genuine security. For many reasons, the Soviet Union is not apt to assign a higher probability of fulfillment to American counterforce threats; under certain conditions, current policy confronts our adversary with a heightened incentive to pre-empt. The conclusion identifies an alternative strategy for the avoidance of nuclear war, a network of doctrines and obligations that calls for a return to minimum deterrence, a comprehensive test ban, and a joint renunciation of the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.


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