Is It the End of the COP as We Know It? An Analysis of the First Year of Virtual Meetings in the UN Environment and Sustainable Development Arena

The year 2020 started much like any other on the United Nations multilateral calendar. But then the COVID-19 pandemic forced the UN and the world to shut down. After the initial shock wore off, secretariats and governments began to contemplate how to conduct multilateral negotiations during a pandemic. As they created new virtual working methods, they also had to figure out how to maintain trust among delegations and in the process itself to ensure the outcomes of these meetings would be respected. To understand how UN meetings adapted to a virtual environment and maintained trust, this article analyzes a sample of 18 meetings of UN environmental and sustainable development bodies that took place in the 12 months between April 2020 and March 2021. The research examines these cases to see how these meetings were conducted, how they built the necessary trust, and what can be learned from this experience.

Fragmented Societies and a Fragmenting International System: Implications for Peacemaking

The cases of peacemaking in Kosovo and Sudan/South Sudan yield insights into the interplay of international politics, relations among political elites, and reconciliation among identity groups. A durable, positive peace requires an approach by peacemakers that encompasses all these dimensions. Complicating matters, the readiness of states to adhere to rules and norms built up over decades has declined in recent years. Absent a concerted effort to (re)build them, the work of peace mediation will become more challenging and the odds of success incalculably longer. This, in turn, will corrode the ability of external powers, competing via proxy, to work together even on unrelated matters in different parts of the globe.

The UN in 21st Century Cyprus: Meditration, Mediation-Lite and Beyond

For decades, the UN has failed to mediate a settlement in Cyprus because of a general and profound weakness: it is unable, outside of unity and resolve in the Security Council, to offer direct incentives to parties in conflict that would shape their calculus towards conflict resolution, or to control the actions of third parties in a way that would incentivize conflict resolution or prevent disincentives. In the resulting vacuum, the prospects for peace settlements come to rest largely on domestic politics within the contesting camps and, sometimes relatedly, on the balance of power between them. In the case of Cyprus, the article claims that these weaknesses on the part of the UN were clearly on display during the negotiation process surrounding the Annan Plan (2001–04) and the resumed process that began in 2008 and ended at Crans-Montana in 2017.

Success in the Shadow of Failure: UN Mediation in Yemen (2011–2015)

Over the past few years, Yemen has become synonymous with mediation failure. This contrasts sharply with the situation in the early 2010s, when the United Nations played a crucial role in persuading Yemen’s long-serving President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to step down from power and, at least initially, successfully steered the country during the ensuing political transition. By analyzing UN mediation efforts during the mandate of Special Adviser Jamal Benomar, the article draws attention to the multiple shifting benchmarks for success. It adopts a phase-differentiated approach to mediation evaluation, which not only allows for recognition of earlier successes, but also enables an analysis of relevant factors influencing mediation success or failure in different stages of the mediation process. In the final instance, the analysis suggests that the eventual failure of UN mediation in Yemen can be traced to conflict and contextual factors rather than the mediator or the mediation process.

Gray Peace: Is Part of a Peace Sufficient?

Completed negotiations often end in shortfalls, half glasses, and way stations. Is that enough to claim success and is a half-loaf sometimes sufficient? The nine articles in this thematic issue examine various forms of incomplete negotiations, from a full-worded agreement that is bypassed, through a formal ceasefire, an agreement among only the agreeables, a mediated but non-transforming agreement, a confidence-building agreement, and finally, claimed resolution that drives violence underground. Sufficiency has different meanings in each case, but generally refers to making some progress in handling the conflict, whereas insufficiency refers to not making progress at any level that is lasting.

Strategies to End Violence in Ethnic Conflicts: What is Sufficient? The Case of “Peace” in Chechnya

After decades of violent separatist conflict between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the region stabilized and peaceful in 2008. Despite this grand proclamation of peace, Chechnya today operates under an environment of violent repression and the conflict remains un-managed. This article argues that a threshold of sufficiency exists which settlement strategies must pass to achieve peace. While a perceived peace may occur when the armed conflict ends, without sufficient management strategies the identity-based roots of the conflict will manifest in other forms beneath the surface. By examining co-optation, power-sharing, autonomy and reconciliation, this research finds that while Russia’s incomplete conflict management strategy may have ended the violent insurgency within Chechnya, the failure to apply these principles sufficiently has allowed violence to continue. This research hopes to be applicable in informing strategies to resolve conflicts in multi-ethnic states within and beyond the North Caucasus.

“Sisters in Peace”: Analyzing the Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in Peace Mediation

This article examines UN–EU cooperation over peace mediation. It compares their conceptual approaches to peace mediation and the evolution of their institutional capacities, demonstrating that the EU has learned from the UN, while actively supporting the strengthening of UN mediation capacity. The most important difference concerns the embeddedness of mediation in a broader foreign policy agenda in the case of the EU compared to the UN. The article also examines models of EU–UN cooperation in mediation practice. Drawing on an overview of cases of UN–EU cooperation, the article develops a typology of the constellations through which the two organizations have engaged with and supported each other. A case study on the Geneva International Discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia investigates the effectiveness of this coordination. The findings point to a high degree of effectiveness, although this has not yet translated into tangible mediation outcomes.

From Paternalism to the Chambas Formula for Mediation: Conceptualizing Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organizations in Mediating Conflicts

This article explores the working relationship between the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in mediating conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel regions. We argue that through the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the UN, ECOWAS and the AU are working on mediation efforts to transcend traditional conceptualizations of the relationship between the world body and regional organizations. We show that the partnership is grounded on the logic of subsidiarity, informality, elite networks, technical competence, soft skills, and robust social trust. For heuristic purposes, we call the six principles the Chambas Formula, with reference to the centrality of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and the emergence and consistent application of the principles in the mediation setting in West Africa and the Sahel regions.

The Competing Mediations in the Post-Qaddafi Libyan Political Crisis

Since the end of the revolution that toppled the rule of Muammar Qaddafi in October 2011, Libya has never known peace. The country descended into civil war with different factions contending for control. In this milieu, the United Nations attempted to mediate an end to the crisis but its efforts have failed to gain traction partly as a result of other mediation initiatives undertaken by several European actors. Sub-regional and continental organizations, including the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the African Union (AU) respectively, that should have taken the lead in the mediation have been absent. Meanwhile, continued fighting has hampered a mediated settlement, and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda have taken advantage of the situation to establish a presence in the country. In the end, rather than ending the crisis, Libya has provided the ground for competing mediation processes which have prolonged the crisis.