Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions

1987 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles A. Johnson
1988 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Miller ◽  
Norval Morris

Intense debate has focused on the use of statistical predictions of dangerousness in the criminal justice system. Two conflicting positions maintain wide support: that such predictions are never appropriate in criminal justice decision-making, and that they should be used far more often. Recognizing the fact that implicit and intuitive predictions are made every day in police, prosecutorial, sentencing, and other decisions, and explicit but unscientific predictions are common, this article suggests a theoretical framework justifying limited use of statistical predictions. Statistical predictions may present, in some instances, a morally preferable alternative to biased nonscientific and implicit judgments. Development of a sound jurisprudence of predictions faces major hurdles given the trend toward unscientific predictions in the law and the enormous judicial confusion in dealing with predictions. The concept has contributed to a string of notably poor Supreme Court decisions.


1964 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 935-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falk

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino is a seminal decision, interpreting significantly the role of a domestic court in an international law case. At the same time, it avoids reaching definitive results. Very little is settled once and for all by the Supreme Court. This realization prompts caution. Sabbatino will not yield an authoritative interpretation, except, perhaps, as a consequence of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. A commentator must be content, therefore, with the less dramatic claims of provisional and partial analysis. Those that claim more are misleading us. The complexity of Sabbatino is almost certain to poison hordes of over-clarifiers who are descending upon this major judicial decision as vultures upon a freshly dead carcass.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R Gray

Abstract State supreme court justices are often the final arbiters of cases in their jurisdictions. Yet, in states that grant governors the power to selectively reappoint supreme court justices, justices’ independence is limited. These governors are able to monitor justices’ decisions and are empowered to remove justices whose jurisprudence conflicts with the governor’s preferences. This power gives governors substantial influence over judicial decision-making by justices eligible for another term on the bench. I test this proposition on an exhaustive set of state supreme court criminal appeals from 1995 to 2010, and show that votes by justices who need to be reappointed covary with executive preferences, and more than votes by justices ineligible for reappointment. These effects are stable across time within a justice’s term so long as the serving governor may one day be their reappointer. I also show that these shifting individual votes lead to changes in outcomes for defendants.


2007 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio Ríos-Figueroa

AbstractLegal reforms that make judges independent from political pressures and empower them with judicial review do not make an effective judiciary. Something has to fill the gap between institutional design and effectiveness. When the executive and legislative powers react to an objectionable judicial decision, the judiciary may be weak and deferential; but coordination difficulties between the elected branches can loosen the constraints on courts. This article argues that the fragmentation of political power can enable a judiciary to rule against power holders' interests without being systematically challenged or ignored. This argument is tested with an analysis of the Mexican Supreme Court decisions against the PRI on constitutional cases from 1994 to 2002. The probability of the court's voting against the PRI increased as the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and the presidency in 2000.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document