An Analysis of Selected Property Tax Exemptions for Timber

1982 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 293 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. David Klemperer
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Tax Exemptions

THE PATTERN OF PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTIONS IN A METROPOLITAN FISCAL SETTING

1979 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary M. Talarchek ◽  
John A. Agnew
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Tax Exemptions

Do State-funded Property Tax Exemptions Actually Provide Tax Relief? Georgia’s HTRG Program

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 608-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spencer T. Brien ◽  
David L. Sjoquist
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Tax Exemptions ◽  
Tax Relief

scholarly journals Immovable Property Tax Exemptions as a Tool of Tax Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 497-504
Author(s):  
Michal Radvan
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
New Classification ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Tax Exemptions ◽  
State And Local ◽  
The Given

This text is dea ling with the exemptions from the immovable propert y tax in the Czech Republic. It brings a new classification of tax exemptions and it overviews this type of correction components. It critically analyses de lege lata regulations in the given area. The hypothesis to be confirmed or disproved is that the Immovable Property Tax Act enables the implementation of the tax policy of both state and local governments. At the end, possible regulations de lege ferenda are drafted.

scholarly journals Race to the Bottom? Local Tax Break Competition and Business Location

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 288-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Mast
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Specific Property ◽  
Location Decisions ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Business Location ◽  
Tax Exemptions

I analyze how competition between localities affects tax breaks and business location decisions. I first use a geographic instrument to show that spatial competition substantially increases firm-specific property tax breaks. I then use this pattern to estimate a model of localities competing for mobile firms by offering tax exemptions. In counterfactual exercises, restricting which levels of government can offer tax breaks has little effect on equilibrium business locations but lowers total exemptions by 30 percent. This suggests that local tax break competition primarily reduces taxes for mobile firms and is unlikely to substantially affect the efficiency of business location. (JEL H25, H71, H73, R32)

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